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This thesis intends to prove that Stephen V. Ash’s model of occupation from his work, 
When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, is applicable to St. 
Augustine’s occupation experience in the Civil War. Three overarching themes in Ash’s work 
are consistent with Civil War St. Augustine. First, that Union policy of conciliation towards 
southern civilians was abandoned after the first few months of occupation due to both non-
violent and violent resistance from those civilians. Second, that Ash’s “zones of occupation” of 
the occupied South, being garrisoned towns, no-man’s-land, and the Confederate frontier apply 
to St. Augustine and the surrounding countryside. Finally, Ash’s assertions that the southern 
community was changed by the war and Union occupation, is reflected in the massive 
demographic shifts that rocked St. Augustine from 1862 to 1865. This thesis will show that all 
three of Ash’s themes apply to St. Augustine’s Civil War occupation experience and confirms 
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Despite numerous writings on the American Civil War, authors continually find 
new approaches, topics, or sources that add to our understanding of the country’s great 
conflict. Whether analyzing new social, cultural, political, or military phenomena and 
events, these additions are often driven by contemporary issues, which stimulate 
historians to revisit old questions with added vigor. This thesis is no different. With the 
United States’ War on Terror and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the question of occupying 
foreign peoples and lands looms larger than ever for scholars of American history. 
Military occupation escaped many Americans attention in the nearly forty years since 
America’s last prolonged occupation experience—Vietnam. However, military 
occupation of foreign lands by the United States military did not originate in Vietnam, 
nor World War II Japan and Germany, or the Philippines; but rather in the numerous wars 
with Native Americans, the Mexican-American War, and the American Civil War. 
One of the U.S. Army’s first experiences with military occupation over a civilian 
population across thousands of square miles occurred during the Mexican-American War. 
The United States Army under Generals Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott fought the 
Mexican Army and invaded Mexico and her northern territories. Though U.S. troops did 
not maintain a permanent presence in Mexico, the country’s northern territories were 
ceded to, and eventually incorporated in, the United States. American forces in Mexican 
territory dealt with many issues involved in military occupation like political resistance 
and military insurgency. This resistance was met with repression, along with numerous 
political, social, and cultural changes to the occupied areas. The few lessons of military 
occupation stimulated some American officers like Henry Halleck to contemplate the 
conduct of war and occupation under international law, but this did not create codified 
 2 
regulations for such operations. Thus despite these experiences, American military and 
political officials were ill prepared for the issues involved with prolonged military 
occupation. It would be these same issues that would be raised over a decade later during 
the Civil War.1 
Confederates viewed U.S. military units stationed in the South in the secession 
crisis as occupying forces of an alien nation. Even before South Carolina state forces 
fired on Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861, United States troops controlled forts, rail depots, 
and cities in the southern states of South Carolina, Virginia, Florida, Texas, Missouri, and 
Georgia. Southern state forces took some of these U.S. Army positions early in the war 
with the goal of seizing all U.S. government positions and property in southern states. 
However, areas under Union control only increased as the months and years of war 
passed, so that by April 1865, Union commanders ruled great expanses of nearly every 
Confederate state. This meant that literally hundreds of thousands of Union troops and 
southern civilians interacted with each other on an almost daily basis across the occupied 
South, leading to many experiences and perspectives.  
                                                 
1 The numerous Indian Wars, most notably the Seminole Wars, could arguably be the first experience with 
U.S. military occupation. For some examples of military occupation in Florida during the Seminole Wars 
see: Edward A. Mueller, “Steamboat Activity in Florida during the Second Seminole Indian War,” Florida 
Historical Quarterly, Vol. 64, No. 4 (April, 1986): 407-431; James M. Denham, “’Some Prefer the 
Seminoles’: Violence and Disorder among Soldiers and Settlers in the Second Seminole War, 1835-1842,” 
Florida Historical Quarterly Vol. 70, No. 1 (July, 1991): 38-64; Matthew T. Pearcy, “’The Ruthless Hand 
of War’”: Andrew A. Humphreys in the Second Seminole War.” Florida Historical Quarterly Vol. 85, No. 
2 (Fall, 2006): 123-153; James M. Denham and Keith L. Hueycutt, “’Everything is Hubbub Here’: Lt. 
James Willoughby Anderson’s Second Seminole War, 1837-1842,” Florida Historical Quarterly Vol. 82, 
No. 3 (Winter, 2004): 313-359. For more information on American military occupation of territories lost in 
the Mexican-American War see: James O’Brien, 'Military Government of Mexico by American Forces 
under General Winfield Scott,’ Reports of the United States Army War College, Historical Section, May 
1943; Durwood Ball, “By Right of Conquest: Military Government in New Mexico and California, 1846-
1851,” Journal of the West, (2002) 8-16. A new dissertation by Thomas W. Spahr actually breaks with 
current work on military occupation in the Mexican-American War by claiming that such occupation was 
not sparse or brief but in fact widespread, carefully planned by the Polk administration, and well executed 
by regular army officers, though this led to eventual atrocities and other negative effects on Mexico after 
the war, Thomas W. Spahr, “Occupying for Peace, the U.S. Army in Mexico, 1846-1848,” (PhD diss., The 
Ohio State University Press, 2011). 
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Despite the work of many capable historians, Florida’s prolonged military 
occupation remains lightly treated. This thesis seeks to apply Stephen V. Ash’s model of 
occupation described in his work, When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the 
Occupied South, 1861-1865 to a Florida city, with the goal of testing Ash’s conclusions 
and generalizations. This thesis contends that St. Augustine, Florida serves as a 
successful test case for Ash’s occupation model applied on the local level and verifies 
Ash’s assertions that southern resistance led to changes in the United States’ war aims 
and policy, that this resistance created three unique spheres of influence called “zones of 
occupation,” and that the conflicts experienced under occupation changed the southern 
community during the war.2 
Authors provided scant treatment to the experiences and perspectives of 
southerners under military occupation for many years after the Civil War. This treatment 
was usually indirect, often associated with works on state histories, regimental histories, 
biographies, and memoirs. Regimental histories were narrowly focused on a particular 
regiment, detailing the men of the regiment, the battles they fought in, and the places they 
visited, without any analysis. Henry F. W. Little’s The Seventh Regiment New Hampshire 
Volunteers in the War of Rebellion published in 1896 illustrates this trend. Though the 
work does contain descriptions of southern cities that the regiment occupied during the 
war, it only briefly describes the most exciting military events, comments on the 
appearance of the city, and moves on to the next great event in the regiment’s service. 
                                                 
2 For recent scholarly works on aspects of military occupation in Florida see: George F. Pearce, Pensacola 
during the Civil War: A Thorn in the Side of the Confederacy. (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 
2000); George E. Buker, Blockaders, Refugees, & Contrabands: Civil War on Florida’s Gulf Coast, 1861-
1865. (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2004); Daniel L. Schafer, Thunder on the River: The Civil 
War in Northeast Florida. (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2010). 
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These histories paralleled and reflected the national mood of reconciliation after the war. 
Veterans’ organizations were among the first to adopt the stance of national 
reconciliation and through their publications they attempted to frame the war as a conflict 
between white brothers. This focus led to the glossing over of the sacrifices of African 
Americans, women, Unionists, as well as larger social, cultural, and labor issues that 
occurred during the war.3 
Regimental histories were not the only publications to gloss over military 
occupation in favor of large battles or political events during and after the war. 
Reconstruction studies often picked up with the end of the Civil War and focused on 
postwar political events in the South. One example of these Reconstruction studies is 
William Watson Davis’ work The Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida, published in 
1913. This work describes Florida from the antebellum period to the end of 
Reconstruction, the bulk of the book lists the larger military events and politics of Florida 
from 1860-1877. Considering this book’s political and military focus, only a minor 
portion of this study deals with military occupation during the war and its affect on the 
southern home front. The Dunning School, a historiographical viewpoint that emerged 
from Professor William Dunning at Columbia University in the early twentieth century, 
also heavily influences this work. The Dunning School argued that Congressional and 
Radical Reconstruction governments were corrupt, inefficient, and abusive to southern 
whites and painted the reassertion of southern white Democrat “redemption” rule of state 
                                                 
3 Regimental histories include: Henry F. W. Little, The Seventh Regiment New Hampshire Volunteers in the 
War of Rebellion. (Concord, NH, The Seventh New Hampshire Veteran Association, 1896); Gaines M. 
Foster, “Veterans Organizations and Memories of the War,” in Steven E. Woodworth, eds. The American 
Civil War: A Handbook to Literature and Research. (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996): 586-570; Kory 
Leland Meyernik, Printed Sources: A Guide To Published Genealogical Records. (Ancestry Publishing, 
1998): 479. 
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governments, after the election of Rutherford B. Hayes in 1877, as a beneficial 
occurrence to the South. This line of inquiry was influenced by racial biases associated 
with Jim Crow, which emphasized the “incapacity” of African Americans to participate 
in government. This school of thought produced works that demonized African 
American, northern settler (carpetbagger), and southern Republican (scalawag) 
involvement in Reconstruction government.4 
These two approaches dominated Civil War historiography for the first eight 
decades after the war and would continue to reemerge in decades of historiography to 
come. However, questions arose in the 1940s about American military involvement in 
foreign lands and the historical origins of this precedent. This change can be attributed to 
American participation in World War II, the emergence of total war, and the subsequent 
military occupation of Germany and Japan. Historians point to this war as one of the 
major factors in raising questions among historians about the historical origins for total 
war and military occupation.5  
Howard Palmer Johnson, “New Orleans under General Butler,” and Joseph Parks 
“Memphis Under Military Rule, 1862-1865,” published in 1941 and 1942, are good 
examples of the beginning of local studies of the occupied South.6 These works discussed 
broad tangible consequences of military occupation that occurred inside New Orleans, 
                                                 
4 William Watson Davis, The Civil War and Reconstruction in Florida. (Gainesville: University of Florida 
Press, 1913); Eric Foner, A Short History of Reconstruction, 1863-1877. (Grand Rapids: Harper Perennial, 
1990): 258; Eric Foner, Forever Free: The Story of Emancipation and Reconstruction. (New York: 
Random House, Inc., 2006): xxi. 
5 Mark Grimsley, “A Directed Severity: The Evolution Of Federal Policy Toward Southern Civilians And 
Property, 1861-1865,” (PhD diss.,The Ohio State University, 1992), 4. 
6 Howard Palmer Johnson, “New Orleans under General Butler.” Louisiana Historical Quarterly, 24 
(1941): 434–536; Joseph Parks, “Memphis Under Military Rule, 1862-1865,” The East Tennessee 
Historical Society Publications, Volume 14, (1942): 31-58 cited in Richard M. Zuczek, “Southern 
Occupation,” in Steven E. Woodworth, eds. The American Civil War: A Handbook to Literature and 
Research. (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996): 548. 
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Louisiana and Memphis, Tennessee. These works discussed the actions of a leading 
politician or general in an occupied city; like issues of censorship, expulsions, inflation, 
social chaos, banditry, guerrillas, prostitution, and many other phenomena of occupied 
life. These factors are briefly discussed and then abandoned without further analysis for 
the next local event of fame. Some local studies, like Parks, emphasized the hardships of 
civilians, who saw economic privations, social change, humiliation, and martial law 
during occupation. Other historians including Johnson, judiciously discussed some 
benefits of occupation, like security, economic recovery, sanitation improvements, and 
public schools. However, authors list events without much analysis. This would be a 
continuous trend among local studies of the occupied South for several decades. 
Shortly after these initial local works on military occupation, historians began 
exploring macro-historical questions of overarching American experiences with aspects 
of modern war that they believed originated in the nineteenth century. The first work to 
discuss military government on a larger scale was Ralph Gabriel’s “The American 
Experience with Military Government,” published in 1944. The author discusses the 
Mexican-American War, the Civil War, the Spanish-American War, World War I, and 
World War II in his discussion of military government. However, Gabriel pays minimal 
attention to the Civil War period, devoting less than three pages to the war. Despite this 
brevity, in only one sentence Gabriel managed to expose one of the major gaps in Civil 
War historiography when he stated, “The rule of the [Union] generals in the South was 
one of the longer American experiences with military government.” Though he did not 
expand on this concept, the author did make clear that further inquiry into military 
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government and occupation was necessary, because of the latitude given Union generals 
occupying southern states.7 
Robert J. Futrell continued this macro approach to military occupation with his 
article, “Federal Military Government in the South, 1861-1865,” published in 1951. His 
work claimed that Union commanders often had little or no instructions in the first two 
years of the war from the Lincoln administration with regards to governing occupied 
areas. Due to the lack of instructions, Union commanders had to improvise and devise an 
occupation administration strategy, which in some cases promoted southern local 
government and legal entities. At the same time, these generals wielded immense power 
over not just the U. S. Army, but over the civilians in the territory the army occupied. 
Futrell argued that the majority of actions taken by occupying commanders were well 
founded, measured responses, and supported local civilian courts and rule. Thus, 
according to Futrell, Union commanders produced overarching policies aimed at 
alleviating the suffering of soldier and civilian alike in the occupied South. However, 
Futrell showed the continuing influence of the Dunning School in his one line about post-
war occupation and Reconstruction when he stated, “[a]t the end of Confederate 
resistance, a majority of Federal Commanders expressed a desire for speedy restoration 
of Southern governments. Unfortunately, such sound counsel would not prevail, and 
Federal military government, conceived as a necessity for successful military operations, 
would be perpetuated for political purposes during the ‘reconstruction’ of the South.”8 
Futrell, like many scholars, still viewed Reconstruction through the Dunning School of 
                                                 
7 Ralph H. Gabriel, “The American Experience with Military Government,” The American Historical 
Review, Vol. 49, No. 4 (July, 1944): pp.630-643, 639; Grimsley, “A Directed Severity,” 4. 
8 Robert J. Futrell, “Federal Military Government in the South, 1861-1865,” Military Affairs, Vol. 15, No. 4 
(Winter, 1951): pp. 181-191, quoted on 191, emphasis not in original. 
 8 
thought, which viewed the period as corrupt and detrimental to white southerners. Years 
would pass before scholars judiciously reviewed the Reconstruction era in Civil War 
historiography. Futrell, however, would not be the last historian who viewed military 
occupation through the prism of official policy, while ignoring its effect on populations 
other than white men.9  
Large overarching works that viewed wartime occupation like Gabriel and Futrell 
were few and far between. The majority of scholarship done from the 1940s to the1980s 
was typical of the trends established by Parks and Johnson. Scholars like Gilbert Govan 
and James Livingood who examined Chattanooga and Peter Maslowski work on 
occupied Nashville were similar in many ways to the earlier studies of Memphis and New 
Orleans. Local studies continued to be produced on military occupation as historians 
analyzed specific aspects of occupation. Though authors like Gerald M. Capers improved 
upon the existing literature of local occupation studies, these additions merely replayed 
less well-known aspects of military occupation in a particular city. These additions also 
had limited corresponding analysis that linked the local incidents to larger events of the 
war, or to similar factors or phenomena occurring elsewhere in the occupied South.10 
                                                 
9 Foner, Forever Free, xxi. 
10 Gilbert E. Govan & James W. Livingood, “Chattanooga Under Military Occupation, 1863-1865,” 
Journal of Southern History, 17 (February 1951): 23-47; Peter Maslowski, Treason Must be Made Odious: 
Military Occupation and Wartime Reconstruction in Nashville, Tennessee, 1862-1865. (Millwood, NY: 
KTO Press, 1978); for the continuation of local studies for certain occupied cities, good examples are: 
Gerald M. Capers, Occupied City: New Orleans Under the Federals, 1862-1865. (Lexington: University of 
Kentucky Press, 1965); Dale A. Somers, “War and Play: The Civil War in New Orleans,” Mississippi 
Quarterly 26 (1973): 3-28; Gary Mills, "Alexandria, Louisiana: a 'Confederate' City at War with Itself." 
Red River Valley Historical Review 5(1) (Winter, 1980): 23–36; Fedora Small Frank, “Nashville during the 
Civil War,” Tennessee Historical Quarterly, 39 (1980): 310-322; Ludwell H. Johnson III, “Blockade or 
Trade Monopoly: John A. Dix and the Union Occupation of Norfolk,” Virginia Magazine of History and 
Biography 93 (1985): 54-78; Edward L. White III, “Key West during the Civil War: An Island of 
Discontent?” Southern Historian 11 (1988): 38-50; David C. Humphrey, “A ‘Very Muddy and Conflicting’ 
View: The Civil War as Seen from Austin, Texas” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 94 (1991): 368-414; 
Dora Alford, “A Decade of Change, Austin County, Texas, 1860-1870,” South Texas Studies 5, (1994): 
131-163. 
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One such factor, African Americans under Union military occupation, received 
increasing attention from scholars with the rise of the Civil Rights movement in the 
1960s. Historians looked at topics like the care given to freedmen and the enforcement of 
equal provisions by the army, as well as the extensive relief work of the freedmen’s 
bureau after the war. Though these works tend to focus on postwar Reconstruction and 
occupation rather than during the conflict itself, these publications illustrate the 
divergence of Reconstruction and African American studies from works on wartime 
occupation, a trend that continues to exist in Civil War historiography. Two early 
examples of this trend published in 1968 are John Kirkland’s “Federal Troops in the 
South Atlantic States during Reconstruction, 1865-1877,” and James Sefton, The United 
States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877. One historian described Kirkland’s work as 
a “tedious […] list of duties punctuated by sweeping hypotheses that are introduced and 
abruptly passed over without development.”11 Sefton suffered similar problems with 
large gaps in his treatment of the army’s enforcement of civilian policy. Furthermore, 
both authors view occupation during Reconstruction in a microcosm, divorced from the 
war itself when military occupation was first established in parts of the South.12 
As Reconstruction studies diverged into its own category separate from works on 
wartime occupation, several other topics that affected or were affected by U. S. Army 
occupation began receiving further treatment during the 1970s with the rise of social 
history. Not content to just view events from the top down, scholars sought to explore the 
bulk of individuals who fought in or experienced the war, but were not politicians, army 
                                                 
11 Quoted in Zuczek, “Southern Occupation,” 548; John Kirkland, “Federal Troops in the South Atlantic 
States during Reconstruction, 1865-1877,” (PhD diss., University of North Carolina, 1968). 
12 James E. Sefton, The United States Army and Reconstruction, 1865-1877. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1968). For an extended discussion of the divergence between African 
American/Reconstruction and wartime occupation studies, see Zuczek, “Southern Occupation,” 547-556. 
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officers, or the elite. These scholars were primarily concerned with the great unspoken 
masses during the Civil War including women, slaves, freedmen, poor whites, 
immigrants, and others who had been glossed over by political and military historians. 
Social history helped create the second overarching literature theme for Civil War 
historiography that differed from strict military or political histories of southern 
occupation. The topic of the Confederate and Union “home front” began rising as an all-
inclusive popular research theme that held under its purview the specific topics of social 
conditions like community, dissent, and women’s studies.13 
Subtopics of “the home front,” are: (1) Community studies or how communities 
change over the course of the Civil War. (2) Works on dissent which focuses on 
Unionists and guerrillas. (3) Women’s histories that emphasize the role of women as 
active agents during the war. Each subtopic has its own historiographical trends and 
patterns which will only be briefly examined here due to their depth. Within community 
studies, aspects of the Confederate home front like the forging of nationalism, the role of 
community in morale and motivation, the social make up of secessionists, Unionists, and 
others were all factors that received attention from the 1970s until today.14 Similarly, in 
works on dissent, scholars have explored Unionists and guerrillas in greater detail as they 
have expanded upon the limited analysis in the beginning of the twentieth century, to 
                                                 
13 For a discussion on works pertaining to the southern home front see: Bill Cecil-Fronsman, “Southern 
Social Conditions,” in Steven E. Woodworth, eds. The American Civil War: A Handbook to Literature and 
Research. (Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996): 530-536.  
14 For rural southern community and home front studies, see: James L. Roark, Masters Without Slaves: 
Southern Planters in the Civil War and Reconstruction. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1977); Randolph 
B. Campbell, A Southern Community in Crisis: Harrison County, Texas, 1850-1880. (Austin: State 
Historical Association, 1983); J. William Harris, Plain Folk and Gentry in a Slave Society: White Liberty 
and Black Slavery in Augusta’s Hinterlands. (Middletown, Conn: Wesleyan University Press, 1985); 
Robert C. Kenzer, Kinship and Neighborhood in a Southern Community: Orange County, North Carolina, 
1849-1881. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1987); Wayne K. Durrill, War of Another Kind: A 
Southern Community in the Great Rebellion. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
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provide a deep and vibrant picture of varying degrees of the prevalence of Unionists and 
guerrillas in the South.15 Lastly, women’s histories have grown to illustrate the vast roles 
that women had on the home front, from supporting soldiers to being the primary 
recipient of U.S. occupation policies and experiences. Each facet of home front studies 
has affected works on southern occupation in ways that are too detailed to note en masse, 
except to say that these trends parallel the work accomplished by “occupation” historians, 
add to their body of work, while reinforcing previous assertions about the chaotic nature 
of southern society at war.16 
All of these trends intermingled in the late 1980s, producing studies that analyzed 
other factors of military occupation from freedmen to Unionists to women. These new 
works provided a more complete picture of the massive changes that rocked southern 
communities occupied by Union forces. The most representative of these works, both 
published in 1988, are Stuart C. McGehee’s, “Military Origins of the New South,” and 
                                                 
15 For works on dissent, Unionism, and guerrillas in the Confederacy, see: Allen Burton Moore, 
Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy. (New York: Macmillan, 1924); Ella Lonn, Desertion during 
the Civil War. (New York: Century, 1928); Georgia L. Tatum, Disloyalty in the Confederacy. (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1934); Stephen E. Ambrose, “Yeomen Discontent in the Confederacy,” 
Civil War History 8, (1962): 259-268; improvements on earlier Unionist overviews include: Paul D. Escott, 
“Southern Yeomen and the Confederacy,” South Atlantic Quarterly 77 (1978): 146-158; Carl Degler, The 
Other South: Southern Dissenters in the Nineteenth Century. (New York: Harper and Row, 1974); Phillip 
S. Paludan, Victims: A True Story of the Civil War. (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1981); 
Richard S. Brownlee, Gray Ghosts of the Confederacy: Guerrilla Warfare in the West, 1861-1865. (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State Press, 1984); Michael Fellman, Inside War: The Guerrilla Conflict in Missouri 
During the American Civil War. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Richard N. Current, 
Lincoln’s Loyalists: Union Soldiers from the Confederacy. (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1992); 
Donald E. Sutherland, “Getting the ‘Real War’ into the History Books,” Virginia Magazine of History and 
Biography 98 (1990): 193-222; Donald E. Sutherland eds. Guerrillas, Unionists, and Violence on the 
Confederate Home Front. (Fayetteville: The University of Arkansas Press, 1999); Robert Russell Mackey, 
The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865. (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 2005); Donald E. Sutherland, A Savage Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerrillas in the American 
Civil War. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009).  
16 Francis B. Simpkins and James W. Patton, The Women of the Confederacy. (Richmond: 1936); Mary 
Elizabeth Massey, Bonnet Brigades (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1966); Bell Irvin Wiley, Confederate Women 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1975); Catherine Clinton, The Other Civil War: American Women in the 
Nineteenth Century. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1984); George C. Rable, Civil Wars: Women and the 
Crisis of Southern Nationalism. (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1989); Catherine Clinton and Nina Sibler 
eds. Divided Houses: Gender and the Civil War. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
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Stephen V. Ash’s Middle Tennessee Society Transformed, 1860-1870: War and Peace in 
the Upper South.17 Both works take the effects of the Union army during the war and 
show how it affected the Reconstruction period in Tennessee. Each work is interested in 
specific phenomena, McGehee in freedmen and Ash who focuses on the larger changes to 
the white community and adjustment to emancipation. However, they both are 
representative of the effects of social history on occupation studies, which blended 
political, military, and social history into a powerful synthesis that illustrated the great 
destruction in Tennessee in a way unmatched by previous works. 
Not content to keep his conclusions about community change confined to Middle 
Tennessee; Stephen V. Ash’s When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the 
Occupied South, 1861-1865, published in 1995, tracks commonalities among military 
occupation throughout the occupied South.18 Ash details how white southerners initially 
accepted occupation for fear they would be exterminated. Once white southerners 
realized the Union adopted a “rose water” or conciliatory approach—meaning that U.S. 
troops wanted to only punish those they viewed as a small group of fire eating 
secessionists without harming the greater population—southerners began resisting Union 
troops. This was done through nonviolent means of insults and refusing to socialize or 
take the oath of loyalty, as well as violent means such as guerrilla warfare. Ash then 
discusses his theory of the zones of occupation, three distinct worlds called garrisoned 
towns, no-man’s-land and the Confederate frontier. These distinct experiences were 
                                                 
17 Stuart C. McGehee, “Military Origins of the New South: The Army of the Cumberland and 
Chattanooga’s Freedmen,” Civil War History 34 (1988): 323-343; Stephen V. Ash, Middle Tennessee 
Society Transformed, 1860-1870: War and Peace in the Upper South. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1988). 
18 Stephen V. Ash, When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, 1861-1865. 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995). 
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created by the proximity of Union forces in the areas. Union forces concentrated in a 
single town or city called garrisoned towns. These garrisoned towns were surrounded by 
no-man’s-land, an area that U.S. troops frequently foraged in and patrolled. This no-
man’s-land ran up to the Confederate frontier, an area that was under Confederate control 
but not immune to Union incursions. Lastly, Ash outlines how the war inflicted changes 
that shook southern communities. These changes ranged from the depopulation of 
garrisoned towns and no-man’s-land, which resulted in a refugee crisis and broke up 
communities due to the depredations of occupation, to the destruction of slavery and race 
controls in the occupied South.19  
Ash’s work remains the single largest occupation model yet employed across the 
occupied South. The author tried to synthesize the growing body of work done on the 
occupied South, an approach historians increasingly adopted in the 1990s. However, this 
work only tracks the privation of southern whites, without giving any consideration to 
variations among Union soldiers, the actions of African Americans, or black soldiers. 
This is due to the author’s stated scope of focusing solely on the experience of white 
southern communities and the changes it underwent. Ash states he decided to maintain 
his focus on the white southern community under wartime occupation because of the 
large body of existing literature on African Americans in the occupied South and 
Reconstruction, reflecting the existing division between occupation, African American, 
and Reconstruction studies. Furthermore, Ash’s work is representative of a relatively new 
trend in historiography called “new military history.” New military history attempted to 
fill the gaps of traditional military history, which analyzed large battles, armies, and 
tactics, by explaining how battlefield success and failures affected life for civilians on the 
                                                 
19 Ash, When the Yankees Came, x. 
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home front. Though this new trend incorporated works from other fields of history, many 
of its proponents admit that it lagged behind other groups in adopting new historiographic 
approaches.20 
This new military history influenced scholars of war, military occupation, the 
home front, Unionists, guerrillas, Reconstruction, international law, and a host of other 
subtopics. A good example of this influence is Mark Grimsley’s The Hard Hand of War: 
Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865 published in 1997. 
Grimsley faulted historians for missing the mark when discussing military policy and the 
Civil War as the nation’s first total war.21 Grimsley argued that too often historians did 
not delineate how and why Union military policy evolved from a conciliatory approach 
from 1861-1863, to a pragmatic policy from 1863-1864, to one of “hard war” from 1864-
1865. These policies were not uniform and had many caveats and facets that existed 
throughout all three periods, affecting the southern home front in a variety of ways. 
Furthermore, Grimsley shows that Union commanders often adapted the orders to the 
situations on the ground, but in the end, all commanders recognized the validity of 
labeling some civilians as non-belligerents, preventing them from crossing the precipice 
into unrestrained total war.22 This work shows that the nuance and subtlety is important 
in delineating the Civil War as different from a total war and is now indispensible for 
                                                 
20 Ash, When the Yankees Came, ix-x. For new military history, its advances, and its slow adoption of new 
historiographic trends see: Richard H. Kohn, "The Social History of the American Soldier: A Review and 
Prospectus for Research," American Historical Review, 86 (June 1981): 553–567; Peter Karsten, "The 
'New' American Military History: A Map of the Territory, Explored and Unexplored," American Quarterly, 
36(3), (1984): 389–418; John Whiteclay Chambers II, "The New Military History: Myth and Reality," 
Journal of Military History, 55 (July 1991): 395–406; John A. Lynn, “Rally Once Again: The Embattled 
Future of Academic Military History,” Journal of Military History, 61 (Oct. 1997): 777–789; John Shy, 
“History, and the History of War” The Journal of Military History, 72 (October, 2008): 1033-1046. 
21 For a thorough discussion of the historiography of noncombatants and total war in the Civil War, see: 
Grimsley, “A Directed Severity,” 1-10. 
22 Mark Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians, 1861-1865. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 1-6. 
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anyone seeking to cover military occupation. By the end of the 1990s, new military 
history had furthered the analysis of the war’s impact on southern civilians. Ash with his 
focus on the general experiences of white southern civilians and Grimsley with his focus 
on military policy toward white and black southern civilians represented the core 
approaches to any new military history of the occupied South.  
 However, this core approach would be disrupted by the last major leap in military 
occupation studies, represented by Judkin Browning’s recent book, Shifting Loyalties: 
The Union Occupation of Eastern North Carolina, published in 2011. Browning forges 
his own approach to occupation studies by explicitly stating that he is neither concerned 
with policy or large generalizations, but how occupation played out on the ground in one 
location, Eastern North Carolina. Furthermore, the author has three main thrusts to his 
focus; that white southerners adapted and shifted loyalties when the situation suited or 
was necessary and even then it did not mean the repudiation of southern culture and 
white supremacy, that this shifting confused and angered U.S. Army soldiers, who not 
only effected occupation but were themselves affected by it, and lastly, that African 
Americans were not passive players but savvy pragmatists who used U. S. Army soldiers 
and benevolent societies to obtain the “four pillars of empowerment, escape, 
employment, enlistment, and education.”23 This approach makes Browning the most 
comprehensive in terms of tracking southern white, African American, and Union troop 
experiences during military occupation in the Civil War. This work also represents how 
new military history has grown in the past thirty years, by combing topics that were 
                                                 
23 Judkin Browning, Shifting Loyalties: The Union Occupation of Eastern North Carolina. (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2011): 1-10, quoted on 3. 
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commonly separated in wartime military occupation, Reconstruction, and African 
American studies. 
Historians produced many works about specific locales under, or phenomena 
associated with, military occupation during the Civil War. So many different approaches, 
topics, and areas received treatment, that it is unwieldy to analyze them all. Nor can a 
comparison between models be successfully completed without extensive analysis into 
both approaches to see commonalities and contrasts. To successfully employ models of 
occupation, each model needs to be tested in a locale to determine its applicability with 
the goal of ultimately combining both approaches to analyze military occupation. 
Therefore, this thesis seeks to focus on the most pronounced overarching study of Civil 
War military occupation, Stephen V. Ash’s When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos 
in the Occupied South, 1861-1865.  
Ash’s model was chosen because it was the only model that covered the entire 
occupied South and provided overarching themes and generalizations about the conduct 
of military occupation. However, the model is limited because it focuses solely on white 
southerners, generalizes Union soldiers, fails to capture the complexity of the move from 
conciliation to hard war, treats African Americans as passive players, and completely 
ignores black soldiers. The model also overlooks variation and unique attributes, which 
complicate military occupation, like topography. Despite these flaws, Ash’s model 
remains the largest occupation study to date and has been utilized by scholarly works on 
the Civil War. Furthermore, the majority of research for this thesis was done prior to 
Browning’s comprehensive study on Union occupation and the scope of the Browning’s 
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work precludes itself from a successful treatment in this thesis. Lastly, Ash’s model has 
yet to be applied to many areas of the occupied South, particularly Florida.24  
This thesis will tackle Ash’s three overarching themes that link together the 
experience of the occupied South: (1) The Union’s evolving war aims from conciliation 
to hard war as it incurred southern resistance. (2) The variation in the experiences of 
southerners residing in three unique spheres of the occupied South. (3) The array of 
conflicts that followed in the wake of the Union army, which changed the antebellum 
southern community. This thesis seeks to use a southern city as a test case to see if Ash’s 
occupation model and his assertions about occupied life apply to a specific city in 
Florida.25  
The southern city to be used as the test case is St. Augustine, Florida. The choice 
of this city is due to its continual occupation by Union forces from March 1862 until 
1868, the prevalence of other garrisoned towns in Northeast Florida, the town’s lack of 
extensive treatment by Civil War scholars, and the numerous unused primary sources 
describing the town’s occupation by Union troops and government officials. Historians 
including Omega G. East, Thomas Graham, George Buker, David J. Coles, and others 
                                                 
24 Several historians have utilized parts of Ash’s model in their works but to list every use of Ash’s work 
would be too long. For major works that utilize his terminology and theory of zones of occupation see: 
Aaron Charles Sheehan-Dean, Why Confederates Thought: Family and Nation in Civil War Virginia. 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2007); John M. Sacher, “A Very Disagreeable Business: 
Confederate Conscription in Louisiana,” Civil War History 53(2) (2007): 141-169; James Alex Baggett, 
Homegrown Yankees: Tennessee’s Union Cavalry in the Civil War. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 2009). For historians who agree with Ash’s arguments on the array of conflicts in the 
occupied South see: Gary W. Gallagher, The Confederate War. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1997); Richard R. Duncan, Beleaguered Winchester: A Virginia Community at War, 1861-1865. (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2007); Richard M. Reid, Freedom for Themselves: North 
Carolina’s Black Soldiers in the Civil War Era. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); 
Paul D. Escott, North Carolinians in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction. (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2008); Stephanie McCurry, Confederate Reckoning: Power and Politics in the 
Civil War South. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010); Browning, Shifting Loyalties. 
25 Ash, When the Yankees Came, x. 
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have written works that dealt with the Ancient City during the Civil War.26 Ash mentions 
St. Augustine a couple of times in his large occupation study, though in both regards, the 
work done on St. Augustine is lacking in depth, detail, and perspective, which warrants 
another scholarly look.27 
Naturally, this thesis cannot cover every facet of Ash’s work on occupation nor 
can it fill every gap in the discussion of St Augustine’s Civil War experience, so it is 
necessary to delineate which portions of Ash’s model will not be addressed. Ash’s 
generalizations about rural communalism and class conflict will not be explored, for as 
Ash states, class conflict in the occupied South was the least prevalent of confrontations 
that influenced community change.28 Furthermore, because of Ash’s neglect of African 
American agency and black soldiers, this thesis will also avoid this topic, as the sources 
and information available is too great to be successfully discussed in the available space. 
What this thesis will illustrate is that Ash’s three overarching themes are applicable to St. 
Augustine and are instructive in illustrating how space, time, and events played a role in 
                                                 
26 The term “Ancient City” has been used by numerous individuals and historians and for a time was the 
name of its local newspaper see: Arthur W. Thompson, “Political Nativism in Florida, 1848-1860: A Phase 
of Anti-Secession.” The Journal of Southern History Vol. 15, No. 1 (Feb., 1949): 39-65, 46; Herbert J. 
Doherty, Jr., “Florida in 1856.” Florida Historical Quarterly 35, No. 1 (July1956): 60-70, 61-62, 64, 66-68. 
For works on Civil War St. Augustine see: Omega G. East, “St. Augustine During the Civil War,” Florida 
Historical Quarterly 31 (October 1952): 75-91; Thomas Graham, The Awakening of St. Augustine: The 
Anderson Family and the Oldest City, 1821-1924. (St. Augustine: St. Augustine Historical Society, 1978); 
George Buker, David J. Coles, and Thomas Graham’s articles appear in Jacqueline K. Fretwell, ed. Civil 
War Times in St. Augustine. (Reprint of El Escribano: St. Augustine Journal of History, vol. 23; Port 
Salerno: Florida Classics Library, 1988). 
27 The reason for using northern sources is twofold, first they are numerous and currently unused in a study 
of occupation in St. Augustine. Second, according to James McPherson, the letters of Civil War soldiers are 
reliable because of the lack of censorship and expressed the true feelings of the soldiers, James McPherson, 
What They Fought For, 1861-1865. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Press, 1994): 1. 
28 Ash, When the Yankees Came, 193; Gallagher, The Confederate War, 178; Ash’s generalizations about 
rural communalism and southern society are also difficult to reconcile with Edward E. Baptist’s 
conclusions about the differences of frontier plantation society from the Old South due to the conflicts that 
arose when slavery expanded to the Old Southwest and Florida. Baptist argues that patriarchal planter 
dominated society never replicated itself in the way it existed in Virginia or South Carolina and was made 
possible only by the concessions of the planter class to yeomen and countrymen, Edward E. Baptist, 
Creating an Old South: Middle Florida’s Plantation Frontier Before the Civil War. (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2002): 1-10, 28, 127, 238, 256.  
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conflicts among Unionists, guerrillas, African Americans, and Union troops in the 
Ancient City. 
In keeping with Ash’s organization, the first chapter of this thesis will briefly 
overview St. Augustine on the eve of the Civil War to show her southern nationalism, 
pro-secessionist attitudes, the fear of U.S. invasion, and condition of the city upon the 
arrival of U.S. Navy gunboats in March 1862. The second chapter will detail the 
applicability of Ash’s model during the early occupation period, March 1862 to January 
1863. The chapter will introduce and discuss Ash’s three overarching themes that this 
thesis seeks to test, in the early occupation period: (1) The Union’s policy of conciliation 
met southern civilian resistance resulting in the Union Army’s change of war aims. (2) 
The zones of occupation, being garrisoned towns, no-man’s-land and the Confederate 
frontier, apply to St. Augustine and the surrounding countryside. (3) That military 
occupation caused substantial changes to the southern community. The third chapter will 
extend the analysis of these three themes to the late occupation period, January 1863 to 
April 1865. Lastly, the conclusion will overview the successful application of Ash’s 
occupation model to St. Augustine and will propose future avenues of inquiry into St. 
Augustine’s occupation. 
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CHAPTER ONE: ST. AUGUSTINE IN THE SECESSION CRISIS 
AND CONFEDERACY 
In his work on occupation, Stephen V. Ash spends a limited portion describing 
the lead up to the Civil War, merely giving an overview of overarching southern thought 
on southern nationalism, secession, community, and the coming war. Ash describes many 
facets of southern communities in the lead up and first year of the war as being: (1) Pro-
southern but not uniformly secessionist. (2) Once these communities seceded, they 
encountered privations from the lack of trade with the North. (3) Southerners feared 
Union invasion so much that panicked evacuations occurred when enemy troops were 
sited. In keeping with Ash’s formats this chapter will provide an overview of the years 
before secession to illustrate the southern nationalism and pro-secessionist beliefs of 
some of the town’s population, as well as how it fits with Ash’s model. Then this chapter 
will describe the condition of St. Augustine when U.S. forces landed there in March 
1862. Lastly, this chapter will discuss the initial evacuation and occupation of St. 
Augustine, which left southern civilians cautious and fearful of Union depredations. 
Historian Thomas Graham argues that the critical moment for the country and St. 
Augustine that led to the Civil War came in the fall of 1859 with John Brown’s raid on 
Harpers Ferry, Virginia. This raid was an attempt by John Brown and his followers to 
initiate a slave insurrection in Virginia by seizing weapons at a government arsenal in 
Harpers Ferry. Brown, who the St. Augustine Examiner stated was of “Kansas nortoriety” 
and “the distinguished Ossawatomic free-soiler and outlaw,” was known among St. 
Augustinians for his supporters’ bloody exploits in Kansas, where they killed men with 
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broadswords in the 1850s.29 But sectional tension did not just begin with John Brown’s 
raid. In the decades prior to the war, political wrangling over slavery’s expansion in U.S. 
territories created crisis after crisis over the fate of the nation. The issue of states’ rights, 
southern nationalism, and secession was linked to the right of southerners to take their 
“property” into the territories. Newspapers across the South had mottos and headlines 
that espoused this belief. The motto of the St. Augustine Examiner stated “Equality in the 
Union and Nothing Less.”30   
St. Augustine’s newspapers reported in great detail John Brown’s actions, 
subsequent trial, and execution. Tensions remained high even after Brown and his 
accomplices were hanged. The fear of slave insurrection haunted the South in the 
antebellum period, and this attempt by a northerner to incite such an insurrection sent 
shockwaves throughout the country. Occasional slave patrols, which were in effect for 
years, were shifted from local citizenry to the Florida Independent Blues. The Blues was 
a seventy-nine-man militia company raised by John L. Phillips and L. M. Andreu in May 
1860 and was eventually integrated into Confederate service in the Third Florida 
Infantry.31 With the election of Abraham Lincoln in November 1860, the majority of 
southerners feared that the “Black Republican” would abolish slavery in the states, 
devastating their way of life economically, culturally, and socially. St. Augustine, like the 
rest of the South, feared this prospect too. The St. Augustine Examiner, on the eve of the 
                                                 
29 St. Augustine Examiner, October 29, November 12, 1859 cited in Graham, The Awakening of St. 
Augustine, 86, 245 n2; quoted in St. Augustine Examiner, October 29, 1859. 
30 For Ash’s brief discussion of the sectional conflict see: Ash, When the Yankees Came, 7-9. For states’ 
rights, slavery in the territories, and southern nationalism see: William W. Freehling, The Road to Disunion 
Volume II: Secessionists Triumphant, 1854-1861. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007): 61-77, 130-
133; St. Augustine Examiner, October 29, 1859. 
31 Graham, The Awakening of St. Augustine, 86-87. 
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election, answered its own question on “What Shall Florida do?” if Lincoln were elected, 
“Secede of course!”32  
Secession was not only favored by many of the prominent men of St. Augustine, 
but by many women from different backgrounds. Frances Kirby Smith, mother to future 
Confederate General Edmund Kirby Smith, was an example of the fire-eater spirit among 
many of the women and men of the Ancient City. In numerous letters to her son serving 
on the western frontier, Mrs. Smith wrote passionately about secession, which dominated 
the conversations in St. Augustine. So fervent were her words that her son marveled at 
her spirit even at the age of seventy. “You are enthusiastic, my dear mother, on the topics 
of the day. The excitement must be intense, the perils great, when a sober, staid old lady 
of more than seventy writes as you do.”33 Other women, like Clarissa Anderson, were 
less impassioned in their zeal for immediate secession, though she suspected northerners 
who stayed in St. Augustine were planning “abolitionist plots against the Southern 
people.”34 Distrust of northerners and a consistent support for southern independence 
would be severely tested in the coming years of war and occupation.  
As Ash describes across the South, though support for states’ rights, slavery, and 
southern independence was popular, it was by no means universal. This is also true in the 
Ancient City. Prominent families in St. Augustine, like the Dunhams, feared that chaos 
would plunge the city into a calamity it could ill afford, given the city’s years of decline 
during the 1840s and 1850s. David R. Dunham, a prominent citizen of St. Augustine, 
                                                 
32 Ash, When the Yankees Came, 9-10; St. Augustine Examiner, November 3, 1860 cited in Graham, The 
Awakening of St. Augustine, 88, 246, n9. 
33 Arthur Howard Noll, General Kirby Smith. (Sewanee, Tenn: The University Press at the University of 
the South, 1907): quoted on 153. 
34 Noll, General Kirby Smith, quoted on 153; Tracy J. Revels, Grander in Her Daughters: Florida’s 
Women During the Civil War. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2004): 10-12, quoted on 10 
and 11. 
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feared the “Blue Cockade of Secessionists” would ruin the county and state by seceding 
from the Union.35 Despite these few dissenting voices, southern nationalism and states’ 
rights remained popular among most of St. Augustine’s population. This is evidenced by 
the results of the election of 1860. Democrat John C. Breckinridge, who pledged a U.S. 
code to protect slavery’s expansion into the territories, outpolled John Bell of Tennessee, 
who pledged to preserve the Union, by 211 to 74 in St. Johns County.36 
After the election of Abraham Lincoln in November 1860, the state of Florida 
began preparing a secession convention in Tallahassee, which delegates from every 
county would attend to vote on an ordinance of secession. On December 15, 1860, the St. 
Augustine Examiner states that prominent citizens of St. Augustine convened in the 
courthouse and nominated Matthew Solana and R. G. Mays as delegates to represent St. 
Johns County and the seventeenth senatorial district. In a written address accepting his 
nomination on December 19, 1860, Matthew Solana stated, “I will be up to the spirit of 
your resolutions, and pledge myself to vote for immediate secession as being the only 
expedient for our Southern States!” Likewise R. G. Mays in his letter of acceptance stated 
on December 17, 1860 that, “[I] pledge myself if elected to act in accordance with your 
instructions, as they entierly [sic] accord with my own convictions, and in my judgment 
is the only course left us consistent with our honor and safety.”37 
                                                 
35 David R. Dunham to Gen. Thomas Brown December 27, 1860, Miscellaneous Manuscript Collection, 
Box 87, P.K. Yonge Library of Florida History, University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida (hereafter cited 
as UF); Ash makes note that Unionists were concerned about the prospect of secession and feared for their 
lives immediately before and after secession across the South, while Revels highlights how many 
prominent women of St. Augustine worried about secession’s negative impact on the local economy, 
particularly trade and tourism, Ash, When the Yankees Came, 10-12; Revels, Grander in Her Daughters, 
10. 
36 Ash, When the Yankees Came, 7-9; Tallahassee, Floridian and Journal, November 17, 1860; Graham, 
The Awakening of St. Augustine, 88; William W. Freehling contends that almost all disunionists favored 
Breckinridge to Bell, see: Freehling, The Road to Disunion Vol. II, 339. 
37 St. Augustine Examiner, December 22, 1860 
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A week later on December 29, 1860, the St. Augustine Examiner described the 
popular vote that had occurred on December 22,  
The election passed off very quietly and many did not vote there being no 
opposition and a prevalent opinion among all classes as to the necessity of 
resistance. Dr. Mays and Mr. Solana will represent ‘old St. Johns’ in the 
constitutional convention and are both pledged to carry out the will of a large 
majority of her people—they will vote for immediate and separate state action in 
the immediate withdrawal of Florida from the Union.38 
 
Secession was adopted by the constitutional convention on January 7, 1861, with both 
Solana and Mays, voting in favor of the ordinance. 
Ash states that across the South with the adoption of secession, trade and tourism 
with the North ended, which created painful economic stagnation. This also holds true for 
St. Augustine. With independence, the Ancient City began its year of home rule by 
cutting off many of the town’s traditional ties to the North. Many Minorcans wanted to 
prevent the arrival of northern ships, and business owners would not accept money 
backed by northern banks. Writing years later about the flight of northerners from Florida 
following secession, John Francis Tenney commented, “the notes of war admonished us 
that Yankees were neither needed nor popular in the limits of the Southern 
Confederacy.”39 Hannah Jenckes tried to keep her friends informed of the events going 
on inside the Ancient City, though she admitted that with the departure of so many people 
and breaking off ties with the North, things were “dull beyond belief.”40 
Confederate mobilization occurred in cities across the South in the months before 
the firing on Fort Sumter, South Carolina. Southerners confiscated United States property 
                                                 
38 St. Augustine Examiner, December 29, 1860. 
39 For Minorcans see: Graham, The Awakening of St. Augustine, 90; quoted in John Francis Tenney, 
Slavery, Secession, and Success: The Memoirs of a Florida Pioneer. (Southern Literary Institute, 1934): 10.  
40 Revels, Grander in Her Daughters, 34; Trade and tourism disintegrated in St. Augustine because of the 
flight of northerners and this too matches what Ash asserts occurred across the South after secession, Ash, 
When the Yankees Came, 13-20. 
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before the war to consolidate their strength and end the remaining Union presence in their 
midst. Florida’s secession convention stated all military installations were to be seized 
and held, as St. Augustinian David Levy Yulee advised his statesmen that the U.S. 
government would try to reinforce those forts if left alone. On January 7, 1861, a party of 
Fernandina and St. Augustine militia confronted Union Ordinance Sergeant Henry 
Douglas at Fort Marion in the Ancient City. After raising objections, the sergeant 
relinquished the keys to the fort and the rebels came into possession of three thirty-two 
pound canons, two eight inch sea howitzers, modified flintlock muskets, and some small 
arms.41 Over a week later on January 15, 1861, “authorities” in St. Augustine confiscated 
a coastal survey ship, the Dana, while the U.S. officer in command was away performing 
his duties. Northern newspapers were livid; “Federal Rights Violated!” exclaimed the 
headline in the New York Times and Confederate property seizures remained one of the 
rallying points for northerners during the secession crisis.42 
In March 1861, news reached St. Augustine that Abraham Lincoln in his 
inaugural address pledged he would regain stolen government property. This immediately 
caused a stir in St. Augustine. Nightly patrols were organized, masters were told to 
ensure their slaves were in their quarters every night, boats were to be secured at nightfall 
to prevent anyone from contacting U.S. Navy ships, and the town’s lighthouse was 
extinguished. On April 19, 1861, Abraham Lincoln announced the U.S. blockade of 
southern ports. This blockade encouraged many shippers from the town to take up the 
                                                 
41 Graham, The Awakening of St. Augustine, 91-92. 
42 New York Times January 24, 1861; On sequestration before the war see: Daniel W. Hamilton, “The 
Confederate Sequestration Act,” Civil War History 52, No. 3, (2003): 373-408, 373-379; for northern anger 
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wartime job of blockade running, and this endeavor was aided by groups of exuberant 
young St. Augustinians who extinguished lighthouses up and down Florida’s east coast. 
Ash asserts that this occurred all over the South in the lead up to war, as nervous 
Confederates who lived on the coast were aware that they were well within striking 
distance of Union troops and warships.43 
In addition to fear of invasion, St. Augustine, like most southern cities, began 
experiencing problems from the lack of trade and tourism with the North that exacerbated 
a growing budget problem after secession. Food prices rose, and citizens began planting 
crops in their small gardens to supplement their diets with potatoes and other produce. 
Blockade-runners like the St. Marys would occasionally bring food to St. Augustine, but 
these shipments were too few and far between to consistently feed the city’s hungry 
population. Writing to a friend, Benjamin Wright stated that those in St. Augustine who 
were not “too poor” were leaving, as St. Augustine dealt with provision shortages. 
Despite these hardships, the ladies of St. Augustine “liberally provided for the families” 
of the town’s militia, while the soldiers were away on patrol duty. This was greeted with 
public pronouncements in the St. Augustine Examiner from the company’s officers 
offering profound thanks for the patriotism and charity of the community.44 
Ash also contends that in the first year of the war, not everyone in Confederate 
service could tolerate the new circumstances and privations associated with 
                                                 
43 Graham, The Awakening of St. Augustine, 93; Dorothy Dodd ed., “Volunteers Report Destruction of 
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independence. In November 1861, two Confederate army deserters from St. Augustine 
stole a small sailboat and set out to join the U.S. Navy blockading off the coast. The two 
deserters made it all the way to Brunswick, Georgia before being picked up by the Union 
ship Mohican.45 Ash details that in many coastal towns of the South, Confederate 
deserters and Unionists kept contact with Union gunboats right up to occupation. Hannah 
Jenckes on the eve of the Confederate pullout from St. Augustine commented, “It has 
leaked out that some one three or four days since had been out to the [Union] vessels, But 
it is kept secret who it is. S--y and her son in law B. are suspected, at all events a guard of 
17 escorted them to the Boats that took the blues to Smyrna. I hope they may be shot.”46 
The St. Augustine Independent Blues were engaged in state service patrolling the 
coast from January to August 1861. The militia unit was organized into Confederate 
service on August 5, 1861. The seventy-nine recruits who first signed up that year later 
grew to ninety-nine, forming Company B of the Third Florida Infantry. The company 
was unique from other regular Confederate units because the regiment had three recruits 
of African American or mixed-race descent. Sons and fathers of prominent families like 
the Dunhams and Phillips’ served in the unit during the war, though many well-to-do 
citizens like the Anderson’s hired substitutes to serve in their stead. After the regiment’s 
organization, many companies were sent in late 1861 to help bolster defenses across 
Northeast Florida, with the Blues remaining in St. Augustine to guard against any 
incursions by the U.S. Navy. Furthermore, just like St. Augustine, other cities on the 
                                                 
45 Comdr. S. W. Godon to Flag Officer S. F. Du Pont, November 28, 1861, Official Records of the Union 
and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion, North Atlantic Blockading Squadron (February 2, 
1865 - August 3, 1865); South Atlantic Blockading Squadron (October 29, 1861 - May 13, 1862), Series I, 
Volume 12, 366, (hereafter cited as ORN), cited in George Buker, “St. Augustine and the Union Blockade,” 
in Jacqueline K., Fretwell, ed. Civil War Times in St. Augustine. (Reprint of El Escribano: St. Augustine 
Journal of History, Vol. 23 Port Salerno: Florida Classics Library, 1988): 3. 
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00.611, UF. 
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coast or near Union-patrolled rivers kept troops nearby to guard against raids from Union 
troops aboard U.S. Navy gunboats.47  
The town remained quiet for the remainder of the year; only the testing of a 
cannon that startled the population in November 1861 produced any excitement for the 
Ancient City. The Blues served in Fernandina for a short time, returning to St. Augustine 
in late January 1862. Recalling their time in St. Augustine, C. Seaton Fleming of the 
Second Florida Regiment, wrote that “this service in St. Augustine […] in which the 
indulgence of an evening entertainment, or a moonlight promenade on the seawall (and 
not always with one’s file leader as a companion) was not an unfrequent recreation after 
the less delightful occupation of the day, and was indeed the poetry of war; and the only 
wounds received by the company were from the arrows of Cupid, who at that time was a 
successful rival to Mars.”48 Their enjoyable service in the Ancient City would not last 
long.  
In March 1862, Confederate forces in the city were ordered to remove some of the 
cannons and all of their troops from St. Augustine’s defense. This was due in part to 
Robert E. Lee’s opinion that “the garrison at St. Augustine only serves as an invitation to 
attack,” when he toured the coastal defenses of the Department of South Carolina, 
Georgia, and Florida.49 The tactical situation in Florida was further complicated when 
Confederate Secretary of War, Judah P. Benjamin, ordered Confederate forces to 
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abandon all coastal defenses of Florida to protect the state’s inland rivers, like the St. 
Marys River. This was done because if these rivers were controlled by the U.S. Navy, the 
river could serve as a highway to take Union gunboats up into Georgia and Alabama. 
This withdrawal of Confederate manpower left less than 1,726 effective troops inside 
Middle and Northeast Florida by the time Union gunboats began anchoring off Florida’s 
east coast near Fernandina and St. Augustine on March 12, 1862. Lee’s recommendation, 
combined with the military reversals at Shiloh, Forts Henry and Donelson, and the 
evacuation of Nashville in the Western theatre during the Spring campaign of 1862, 
caused Benjamin to withdraw many Confederate units from Florida, and ensured St. 
Augustine would be left defenseless.50 
Ash contends that with the manpower drain occurring all over the South prior to 
Union occupation, southerners reacted quickly, often packing up and evacuating their 
town at any sign of approaching Union troops, fearful of what Union soldiers might do to 
the defenseless population. After the sighting of an unidentified ship off the coast on 
March 9, 1862, the city’s defenders were ordered to evacuate the town the following day. 
Around thirty men accompanied by wagons left the city at ten at night while the rest of 
the company evacuated in small boats. In addition to these troops, about a fifth of St. 
Augustine’s southern civilians streamed out of the town rather than face the prospect of 
occupied life. As an act of symbolic resistance in the face of retreat, a group of women 
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chopped down the flag pole in the center of the town to prevent the U.S. flag from flying 
on it.51 
Occupying St. Augustine was not originally part of the Union’s plan to subdue 
Florida. But in an effort to curb blockade running in Florida, Union troops occupied 
Fernandina, Jacksonville, and St. Augustine. General George B. McClellan advised that 
St. Augustine should be occupied along with Fernandina to prevent this illicit trade. The 
Unions’ original plan was to capture Jacksonville first and use the gunboats to transfer 
two regiments of infantry with light artillery up the St. Johns River to Picolata and then 
turn east to march the eighteen miles to St. Augustine, capturing the city from the rear.52  
However, these elaborate plans proved unnecessary. On March 11, 1862, the U.S. 
Navy ship Wabash anchored off the mouth of St. Augustine’s harbor. This ship was there 
to help blockade the port without plans to occupy the town, however, after seeing a white 
flag raised above Fort Marion, Commander C. R. P. Rodgers accompanied by a small 
party of men, arrived at the wharves and was greeted by the acting mayor, Christobal 
Bravo, along with a throng of onlookers. Once they made their way to the town hall 
where the city council was convened, the formal surrender ceremony was conducted, and 
St. Augustine was handed over to the Union. Once this was accomplished, Commander 
Rodgers, “called upon the clergymen of the city, requesting them to reassure their people 
and to confide in our kind intentions toward them,” hoping to assuage the southern fears 
of Union pillage and destruction.53 
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Despite the surrender, no U.S. troops were present inside St. Augustine until 
Union troops arrived in town over a week later. On March 18, 1862, a detachment of 
Marines from one of Commander Rodgers’ ships landed in St. Augustine and took 
control of the city. The Marines remained there until March 24 when they loaded back 
onto transports and the Fourth New Hampshire’s company took over control of St. 
Augustine. After the Marines departed, the mayor and city council asked Flag Officer Du 
Pont to keep the Marines stationed in the town on account of their “good conduct and 
discipline of troops.” This request, though graciously received, was not accepted, and 
volunteer army units would be the primary occupying force in St. Augustine. The Union 
forces occupying the city would remain there till the close of the war and into 
Reconstruction.54  
Ash states that when Union troops first occupied towns, they sought to conduct 
themselves as professionally as possible and offered bold pronouncements about 
reconciliation, friendship, and promises of leaving the general population alone and 
unmolested. From the moment Commander Rodgers accepted the surrender of St. 
Augustine on March 11, 1862, Union forces attempted to alleviate the concerns of the 
anxious southerners whose city they now occupied. The calling of the clergy and the kind 
actions of the Union Marines are all examples of early attempts to win over the southern 
population. Additionally, on March 20, 1862, General Thomas W. Sherman released a 
circular stating to the people of East Florida that,  
The troops of the United States have come amongst you to protect loyal citizens 
and their property from further molestation by the creatures of a rebel and usurped 
authority, and to enable you to resuscitate a Government which they have 
ruthlessly endeavored to destroy. All loyal people who return to or remain at their 
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homes in the quiet pursuit of their lawful avocations shall be protected in all their 
rights within the meaning and spirit of the Constitution of the United States. The 
sole desire and intention of the Government is to maintain the integrity of the 
Constitution and the laws and reclaim States which have revolted from their 
national allegiance to their former prosperous and happy condition.55 
 
These pronouncements alone were not enough to entice the great majority of 
southerners to declare themselves with the Union in those areas now occupied by the 
Union. In St. Augustine, Commander Rodgers commented “there are many citizens here 
who are earnestly attached to the Union, a large number who are silently opposed to it, 
and a still larger number who care very little about the matter.”56 Despite all the 
reassurances Rodgers made to the congregations and the good conduct of the Marines, 
some citizens still loathed the presence of Union troops. Rodgers noted that there was 
“much violent and pestilent feeling among the women” of St. Augustine, a sentiment that 
Ash contends was common across the occupied South. For their part, the majority of St. 
Augustinians would watch and wait before testing the patience of the new occupiers.57  
St. Augustine’s Confederate experience fits with Stephen V. Ash’s points about 
southern towns on the eve of the Civil War. Many St. Augustinians were committed to 
southern nationalism, St. Augustinians suffered economic hardships after secession, the 
town was fearful of U.S. invasion, some citizens welcomed the Union soldiers, while 
most civilians watched and waited. All of these experiences are described by Ash as 
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prevalent in the South up to initial Union occupation. St. Augustine had many parallels to 
other southern cities and suffered similarly during the coming tragic war. 
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CHAPTER TWO: ASH’S MODEL IN THE EARLY OCCUPATION 
PERIOD, 1862-1863 
This chapter will focus on applying Stephen V. Ash’s model of occupation to St. 
Augustine in the early occupation period, March 1862 to January 1863. First, this chapter 
will discuss Ash’s zones of occupation. These zones were three unique worlds in the 
occupied South: garrisoned towns, no-man’s-land, and the Confederate frontier. These 
three zones will be applied to St. Augustine, which will illustrate how the garrisoned 
town was isolated by a dangerous countryside subject to frequent Union and Confederate 
raids called no-man’s-land. This resulted in the isolation of garrisoned towns leading to 
economic privations. Civilian non-violent resistance led to martial law and an eventual 
rise of guerrilla warfare. This resistance and the unique topography of Northeast Florida 
created a region of Confederate control that was subject to occasion Union raids called 
the Confederate frontier. Then, this chapter will discuss Ash’s assertions that the insults 
against soldiers, persecutions of Unionists, and irregular warfare that occurred in St. 
Augustine and no-man’s-land led to a change in Union war aims. This change was 
spurred by frustrated and confused Union soldiers who slowly pursued harsher policies of 
martial law, reprisals, the targeting of southern property, and expulsions of southern 
civilians. All of this inflicted painful changes to the regions population that will be 
illustrated by the sharp demographic decline of St. Augustine in the early occupation 
period. 
In his work When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, 
1861-1865, Stephen V. Ash called areas under direct occupation by U.S. troops 
garrisoned towns. In essence, a garrisoned town was a small island of Union control in a 
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sea of “Rebeldom.”58 Garrisoned towns had many facets to their occupation experience 
such as: fear of attack, defiance, martial law, inflation, supply issues, humanitarian 
efforts, and prostitution all behind U.S. defenses. These defenses created safe havens for 
Unionists, beacons for African American self-emancipation, and brought a level of 
normality to everyday life inside the garrisoned town. Garrisoned towns contained Union 
troops, usually five companies or a whole regiment in strength, with some artillery and 
cavalry if lucky. These troops occupied defensible towns and forts rather than spread U.S. 
troops all over the countryside, which would weaken their control and negate the impact 
of their concentrated firepower.59  
Due to lurking rebel forces and civilian resistance, the garrisoned town was 
surrounded by an ever changing and potentially hostile countryside. This zone, called no-
man’s-land, was subject to Union patrols and Confederate raids. No-man’s-land was not 
static. It could expand as U.S. troops garrisoned other nearby towns extending the range 
that their pickets, patrols, and foragers could penetrate. No-man’s-land could also 
contract, as Union troops came under ambushes in the area or if the Union war effort 
suffered a strategic setback and was forced to abandon a city. Lastly, there was the 
Confederate frontier, an area at the farthest extent of Confederate authority. This zone 
was farther away from garrisoned towns but still experienced Union raids, which were 
rare by comparison with the intrusion felt by no-man’s-land.60 
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In the occupation’s initial stages, Union authority was decidedly weak outside of 
the garrisoned town and often provisions were non-existent. Union troops often stuck 
close to the town proper until pickets had ensured the area immediately outside the town 
was safe from Confederate irregulars.61 U.S. troops in St. Augustine did not dare venture 
too far from Fort Marion, for fear of Confederate attack. The four companies of the 
Fourth New Hampshire who had relieved the Marines at St. Augustine anxiously locked 
themselves up in Fort Marion awaiting reinforcements, as it would take a few days before 
the requests for reinforcements reached the commanders at Hilton Head, Fernandina, and 
Jacksonville. In the meantime, troops fed starving citizens when they could, but refused 
to expose themselves outside of the town to find additional supplies. It was not until April 
15, 1862 that three additional companies of the Fourth New Hampshire, provisions for 
sixty days, and 60,000 cartridges landed in St. Augustine, fresh from the evacuation of 
Jacksonville.62   
During the interlude, some Union officers and soldiers thought the town could be 
easily over run. For instance, in late March 1862 Colonel Louis Bell of the Fourth New 
Hampshire Volunteers, then commandant of St. Augustine, was not even sure his two 
hundred men could hold the town if attacked. Brigadier-General H. G. Wright, then 
stationed at Jacksonville on March 27, 1862 denied Bell’s request for reinforcements, 
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It is no doubt true that you cannot with your present strength successfully defend 
the town from any attempt in force against it; and I should therefore advise that 
you confine your undertakings mainly to the fort and its surroundings, leaving the 
defense of the place, to some extent at least, to the inhabitants. […] This, at any 
time, is all they could demand. In their present attitude, judging from your views 
as to their want of loyalty, it is more than they have a right to expect.63 
 
Union troops early on were not willing to bet their safety on the loyalty of the 
community. 
Charles A. Cressy, a Union soldier in the Fourth New Hampshire, shared his 
commander’s view and stated several times in his journal that there were constant rumors 
of attack on the lightly defended city. For example, on April 9, 1862, Cressy records that 
the all of the companies went up to the fort at nightfall with all their arms and equipment, 
fearing an attack on the city.64 Rumors of attack were not just benign fears that went 
unnoticed by Union commanders and troops. Rather, these rumors and fears led to false 
alarms, panicked gun fire, and stressful movements of entire companies. These 
companies routinely trudged from the St. Francis Barracks on one end of town, where 
many of the Fourth New Hampshire were stationed, over to Fort Marion on the other side 
of town for protection against possible attacks. Other times soldiers could be woken up 
by “the long roll” in the middle of the night, where they had to form lines of battle and 
could wait for an attack for hours. Tensions ran high in town for good reason, as 
Confederate sharpshooters took shots at Union pickets in town on one occasion.65  
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These frequent alarms, the issues arising from the defiance of southerners in town, 
and the small two hundred man garrison, led Union forces to renege on their initial 
statements that the inhabitants of St. Augustine would not be molested. Despite 
Commander Rodgers’ assurances that municipal government would continue to function, 
local government in St. Augustine under Mayor G. A. Pacetti lasted from March 25, 1862 
to April 12, 1862, ending when martial law was declared. Writing to General Benham, 
Colonel Bell explained he found, “a constant communication was kept up between the 
inhabitants of this city and the enemy and that members of the city government would not 
assist me in preventing it, I placed the city under martial law.”66 Though Colonel Bell 
reported he believed the residents wanted martial law, subsequent actions proved 
otherwise. This fits with Ash’s assertions that situations like the one Bell found himself 
in is similar to many Union commanders across the occupied South, as both Generals 
Butler and Sherman suspended local municipal government shortly after taking 
possession of New Orleans and Memphis respectively.67 
All over the occupied South, Ash claims local commanders fretted about what to 
do with self-emancipated slaves, especially as the government refused to establish a firm 
policy. This is true too for St. Augustine, as Colonel Bell in the same note to General 
Benham, asked the decisive question that could affect the course of the Civil War. “I 
have the honor to request instructions as to slaves belonging to disloyal men. I have 
retained such slaves, furnishing them with food and compelling them to work, and simply 
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excluding other slaves from the fort.”68 It would be some time before concrete answers 
were provided. 
Martial law did not immediately put an end to non-violent civilian resistance, 
especially on the part of women. In May 1862, a group of girls went to the remains of the 
flagpole that was chopped down and kissed its pieces fervently in front of the U.S. troops. 
When Union soldiers burned down the pole’s stump in frustration, the women came the 
following day and took the remains for keepsakes. Though Union troops mocked the 
display, Colonel Bell was less amused.  
Certain women having conducted themselves, last evening and this morning, in a 
manner grossly insulting to the United States Forces stationed here, by collecting 
together in the Plaza and there openly manifesting their disloyalty to the United 
States, I have ordered that hereafter any woman who shall be guilty of any open 
and offensive exhibition of disloyalty, shall be considered as having forfeited 
immunity from punishment by reason of her sex, and shall be held in strict arrest. 
And furthermore, if any such disgraceful scene is reenacted, I shall enforce the 
full vigor of Martial Law in the city.”69  
 
Colonel Bell, like General Butler in New Orleans, would not tolerate open defiance. 
Security demanded it. 
After martial law was imposed, some soldiers maintained their fear of attack 
while others felt secure inside the garrisoned town. In St. Augustine, Union soldiers 
became cynical of potential attacks on the city and casually brushed off rumors of large 
rebel forces lurking in the area. On July 13, 1862 Leander Harris described that officers 
had received reports that a party of “800 guerrillas” were in the woods surrounding the 
city. This was not the first time that reports of large guerrillas forces in the area, though 
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each report proved to be unfounded. Due to these repeated rumors, Harris claimed that he 
“shall not lose any sleep on that account!”70  
The lack of skirmishes around St. Augustine in the first two months after initial 
occupation, Ash claims, is not unique and in fact occurred across the occupied South. 
This lack of outright violence occurred for several reasons: (1) Southerners in garrisoned 
towns were afraid to openly resist Union forces for fear of rape and destruction that they 
expected to be exacted on them. (2) Most of the South’s manpower was drained by 
mobilization and conscription, offering few available men to fight off the U.S. Army. In 
addition, white male southerners who did stay behind were often young boys, old men, 
home guard units, and Unionists, none of whom would oppose the magnitude of U.S. 
power being brought to bear in Northeast Florida. (3) Guerrillas reflected broader 
communal morale, as civilian resistance to Union rule increased, so did guerrillas when 
available manpower enabled it.71  
With garrisoned towns cut off from their surroundings due to martial law and 
growing violence from Confederate irregulars, local economies were broken. St. 
Augustine’s antebellum economy was directly linked to its access to the interior of 
Florida. The closest access point for materials and people coming from the coast to the 
interior and vice versa ran through Picolata on the east bank of the St. Johns River. 
During the antebellum period, goods, slaves, and tourists floated up the St. Johns River, 
disembarked at Picolata, and then had to travel overland by stage coach on bad roads for 
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eighteen miles, a journey which could take over three and a half hours.72 This connection 
between St. Augustine and Picolata lasted for decades during the antebellum period and 
remained intact during the first year of Confederate rule of Florida. During the period of 
Confederate control, Picolata was used to ferry Florida’s state militia between Northeast 
Florida and the rest of the state, continuing the town’s tradition of being the western 
gateway to St. Augustine.73  
This connection between St. Augustine and Picolata came to an end with the 
declaration of martial law in St. Augustine in April 1862. Garrisoned towns were at times 
completely cut off from the surrounding countryside and other towns for weeks or 
months at a time. This is true for the connection between Picolata and St. Augustine, 
which isolated the families, communities, as well as the businesses of St. Johns County, 
causing additional social and economic strain to the area.74 Without tourists from the 
North to visit the two cities and the halting of goods coming in from the interior or coast 
by the Union blockade, St. Augustine and Picolata were deprived of their most lucrative 
businesses. Additionally, businesses that had resided in the region for years were slowly 
pushed farther and farther away from roving Union patrols originating in the Ancient 
City. 
Privations inside garrisoned towns multiplied under these isolated conditions. In 
St. Augustine these privations can be illustrated in the writings of A. H. Young of the 
Seventh New Hampshire, who observed that though some citizens in town were worth 
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“thousands” they were in reality destitute as all their worth was in “Florida money,” 
which resulted in nearly one third of the population being supported by Union 
provisions.75 Colonel Louis Bell of the Fourth New Hampshire Volunteers requested 
food shipments from captured ships off the Florida coast, because the civilians of St. 
Augustine had so little food and the Fourth’s own rations were dangerously low.76 
Supplies were slow in coming due to the lack of transport vessels, the isolation of St. 
Augustine, and bureaucratic wrangling between the Department of the South and the War 
Department. The overall effects of waiting nearly a month to receive supplies led various 
commanders to take matters into their own hands. Without orders Colonel Bell, whose 
men had recently helped capture a marooned Confederate blockade-runner, distributed 
food to the townspeople and his men who were all on limited rations.77 
These food shortages and supply problems led some U.S. soldiers to focus on 
what they described as the “lazy” attitude of the white population of St. Augustine. 
Soldiers like Corporal J. Milton Durgin and Second Lieutenant Calvin Shedd of 
Company A, Seventh New Hampshire Volunteers, marveled at how oranges and flowers 
could grow at nearly all times of the year, which prompted Shedd to wonder why so 
many local plots of land were not being utilized by the town to grow the food they 
                                                 
75 A. H. Young to Susan, September 9, 1862 Andrew Hale Young Papers 1827-1890, MS 132 July-
December 1862, Rauner Special Collections, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire. 
76 Lieut. Col. Louis Bell to Brig. Gen. H. W. Benham, April 15, 1862, War of the Rebellion, Series I, 
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Louis Bell to Lt. Comdr. Nicholson, April 4, 1862, ORN, Series I, Volume 12, 709-710. 
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desperately needed and begged for.78 Some officers and their wives took it upon 
themselves to make gardens while they resided in the town. Union officers kept these 
small plots and the fruits of their labor were rarely shared with the men under their 
command. As a result, many soldiers risked confrontation from guerrillas or hungry 
civilians and simply picked the fruit of the occupied townspeople, or the groves that 
resided outside the town limits, at their own peril.79  
Garrisoned towns were isolated and surrounded by a dangerous, fluid, and 
unpredictable no-man’s-land. No-man’s-land varied greatly during the war based on local 
campaigns, grand strategic movements, and a general fear of being surprised or 
ambushed. These areas saw frequent visitations from Union troops, which viewed no-
man’s-land as under their control, despite its susceptibility to Confederate, partisan, or 
guerrilla attacks. Garrisoned towns and no-man’s-land were by no means static or 
permanent; in many cases a garrisoned town could be evacuated to reinforce other Union 
garrisoned towns in the area. This would change the whole strategic outlook and expand 
or contract no-man’s-land based on the distance to the next Union garrisoned town. A 
good example of this happening in Northeast Florida was the evacuation of Jacksonville, 
Florida, three separate times before a permanent U.S. Army presence was established in 
1864.80 
In part of the early occupation period, roughly March to October 1862, no-man’s-
land extended six miles outside of St. Augustine in all directions. This limited extension 
                                                 
78 Ash states that northern scorn over southern society and perceived laziness occurred over much of the 
occupied South. Ash, When the Yankees Came, 34-35; J. Milton Durgin to Sister, September 24, 1862; 
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79 For Union requisition of food see: Ash, When the Yankees Came, 53-54; Calvin Shedd to Wife, March 
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80Troops abandoning Jacksonville bolstered St. Augustine’s defenses, War of the Rebellion, Series 1, 
Volume 6, 100; East, “St. Augustine During the Civil War,” 75-77; Nulty, Confederate Florida, 48, 85, 
100.  
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is for three main reasons: (1) St. Augustine’s garrison lacked cavalry. This limited the 
range of effective patrols in the area as any patrol would be by foot, through tough 
undergrowth where opportunities for ambush abounded. This confined Union soldiers to 
six miles distance around St. Augustine before returning to the Ancient City when not 
using main roads. (2) Only a few major roads connected St. Augustine to Jacksonville to 
the north, Picolata to the west, and New Smyrna to the south. These roads were rough, 
lacked proper maintenance, and traversed wild terrains of palmettos, swamps, and pine 
forests. Only the road to Picolata could guarantee the Union control one way for eighteen 
miles. However, this required U.S. Navy gunboats to anchor off Picolata for such deep 
excursions. (3) St. Augustine’s distance from the St. Johns River precluded it from being 
able to engage in the successful naval raids that extended from Jacksonville and 
Fernandina on the St. Johns and St. Marys River. Any transport of troops from St. 
Augustine had to leave her harbor, travel north to the mouth of the St. Johns River, pass 
Jacksonville and proceed up river into the Confederate frontier. From there troops could 
only disembark at small docks in places like Picolata, Palatka, and Welaka. The latter two 
were still under Confederate control in 1862.81 
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According to Brigadier General H. W. Benham, a general in the Department of 
the South, St. Augustine, as well as much of Florida, lacked any type of reliable land-
based transportation. To make things worse, there were precious few gunboats and even 
fewer transport and supply ships, all of which were subject to removal to another theatre 
of the war. This meant that Union troops at St. Augustine were alone in covering the vast 
stretch of no-man’s-land, where the only other forces available were engaged in the 
occupations of Jacksonville and Picolata. As commanders would complain the entire war, 
St. Augustine’s garrison did not contain a cavalry detachment, which made pursuing any 
raiders from the Confederate interior nearly impossible.82 
One default in Ash’s model is he does not note how the conflicts in no-man’s-land 
were complicated by natural topographic features such as mountains to hide in, or rivers 
to use as highways for shuttling troops. Topography could affect the strategic situation 
and this important feature is glossed over by Ash in his work. In Florida, the value of the 
St. Johns River for both Union and Confederate forces in the Civil War cannot be 
overstated. It served as a natural border between the Confederate frontier and no-man’s-
land and as a highway for Union gunboats to patrol and raid deep into Northeast Florida. 
Furthermore, the land in Northeast Florida was routinely described as one big, desolate, 
pine desert, which complicated overland movements by both Union and Confederate 
troops. In addition, Union gunboats floated up and down the St. Marys and St. Johns 
River to create an “inner blockade” on Florida’s rivers, strangling trade even further. This 
                                                 
82 Brig. Gen. H. W. Benham to General M. C. Meigs, May 23, 1862, War of the Rebellion, Series I, 
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was very effective in concentrating the blockade, as ships off the coast could be blown 
off their positions by the storms and rough seas of the Atlantic Ocean.83  
Throughout the conflict, both sides maneuvered to cut the river and the rest of the 
state off from each other, thereby denying important resources, information, and mobility 
to the enemy. In March 1862 just after the occupation of St. Augustine and Jacksonville, 
both Confederate and Union forces destroyed small boats up and down the St. Johns 
River in an attempt to prevent Unionists, deserters, and slaves from relaying information 
to the other side. Union commander Maxwell Woodhull estimated that over one thousand 
small boats were destroyed by Union forces along the St. Johns River to prevent the 
movement of, or the flow of information to, guerrillas. Confederate General Joseph 
Finegan wanted to achieve similar limits of information flowing to Union gunboats and 
ordered all people of questionable loyalty along the east bank of the St. Johns River to ten 
miles inland on the west bank of the St. Johns River for close surveillance. In October 
1862, Captain J. J. Dickison was ordered to remove all slaves with absent owners and 
freedmen to the west bank of the St. Johns River for similar reasons.84  
One factor Ash describes that is applicable to Northeast Florida is the plight of the 
Unionists in no-man’s-land. Though many Union officers questioned the loyalty of St. 
Augustinians, Unionists from all over no-man’s-land in Northeast Florida were proving 
that their loyalties lay with the old flag. Information flowed between garrisoned towns 
and no-man’s-land, many of the alarms and rumors given to Union troops came in from 
these Unionist residents in the countryside, making them targets for Confederate 
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irregulars. Confederates recognized this problem and thought they knew how to solve it. 
J. W. Pearson of the Ochlawaha Rangers stated “at least three-fourths of the people on 
the St. Johns River and east of it are aiding and abetting the enemy; we could see them at 
all times through the day communicating with the vessel in their small boats. It is not safe 
for a small force to be on the east side of the river; there is great danger of being betrayed 
into the hands of the enemy. I fear this will be no better until martial law is proclaimed 
and several of them hung,” with three or four specific people in mind. Other men made 
good on their threats to kill Unionists in no-man’s-land. In June 1862, “Confederate 
guerrillas” hung a man outside of St. Augustine.85 
The combat leader of Confederate attempts to thwart Union control of no-man’s-
land on the east side of the St. Johns River was Captain J. J. Dickison, commander of 
Company H in the Second Florida Cavalry, whose raids and presence would be feared 
and guarded against by Union forces for the entire war. Dickison’s reputation, exploits, 
and strategic influence were well known among Union forces and southern civilians 
alike. Though a member of the regular army, Dickison’s Confederate cavalry employed 
guerrilla-style tactics, which suited Northeast Florida’s heavily timbered countryside of 
no-man’s-land where, with the small number of troops he had available, he was able to 
harass Union scouts and foraging parties.86 
                                                 
85 T. W. Sherman to Adjunct-General U. S. Army, March 25, 1862, War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume 
6, 250; J. W. Pearson to General Richard F. Floyd April 8, 1862, War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume 53, 
233-234; Chas. G. Halpine to Lieut. Col. Louis Bell, June 20, 1862, War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume 
14, 356-357.  
86 Mary Elizabeth Dickison, Dickison and His Men: Reminiscences of the War in Florida. (Louisville: 
Courier-Journal Job Printing Company, 1890): 46; East, “St. Augustine during the Civil War,” 89; Graham, 
The Awakening of St. Augustine, 125-126, 129-130; Nulty, Confederate Florida, 56, 133, 196, 201.This fits 
with Ash’s work on occupation as he discussed how guerrilla warfare became endemic in no-man’s-land 
that surrounded garrisoned towns, though Confederates infrequently assaulted the garrisoned towns 
themselves, where Union forces were strong enough to turn away traditional Confederate attacks, Ash, 
When the Yankees Came, 21-22, 34, 47-49; Other historians of occupation discuss similar issues of raiders, 
 48 
The effect that irregular forces in no-man’s-land had on occupation is illustrated 
in the letters of J. Milton Durgin, a corporal in the Seventh New Hampshire Volunteers. 
Durgin writes of the need for excessive picket patrols, “We have a great deal of Picket 
Duty to perform for fear of the guerrillas, a great number of who, hover around the place 
ready to enter and burn and plunder when an opportunity presents itself for them to do so 
without much danger to themselves.”87 Picket duty took soldiers to the very edges of 
Union control in no-man’s-land around St. Augustine. The frequency with which pickets 
shot into the darkness at any sign of movement is a testament to the strain that Union 
troops were under. Andrew Hale Young, a member of Colonel H. S. Putnam’s Seventh 
New Hampshire Volunteers, stated that Union lines extended less than half a mile outside 
of the town proper, with Union forces essentially “contained” within St. Augustine. 
Nervous Union pickets and an inability to expand pickets beyond the edges of St. 
Augustine indicates the effectiveness of J. J. Dickison and his men of the Second Florida 
Cavalry at inhibiting an effective Union presence in the no-man’s-land around St. 
Augustine.88 
Ash discusses the extremely dangerous nature of no-man’s-land during the Civil 
War. Union Regiments from St. Augustine or Jacksonville preferred to travel by water up 
and down the St. Johns River rather than march overland on difficult terrain where 
possible ambushes lay in wait. Captain J. J. Dickison, though not always successful in his 
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attempts to disrupt Union positions, made his presence well known to Union troops in the 
area and was considered a serious threat by U.S. authorities.89 During ventures Union 
troops made outside the garrisoned town on fatigue duty (the gathering of supplies, 
chopping wood, etc.) soldiers fell prey to unexpected guerrilla raids from Captain 
Dickison, who took small amounts of Union troops prisoner and persecuted Unionist 
residents of the east bank of the St. Johns River. Residents were held and prevented from 
relaying rebel movements to Union forces, and on more than one occasion, civilians were 
killed for not supporting the guerrilla fighters.90  
An example of the danger of no-man’s-land can be illustrated in the summer of 
1862, when guerrilla warfare became problematic for Union troops in Northeast Florida. 
The New York Herald reported that, “The inhabitants [of St. Augustine] are not 
privileged to go out because of bands of guerrillas who are everywhere organizing. This 
has produced a reign of terror in the neighborhood. Guerrillas do not hesitate to kill those 
who differ from them.”91 This resistance drove General Benham to propose harsh 
measures for those who resisted Union army rule; any irregular force that injured loyal 
Unionists "contrary to the laws and usages of war shall be visited fourfold upon the 
inhabitants of disloyal or doubtful character nearest the scene of any such wrongs when 
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the actual and known perpetrators cannot be discovered."92 This chaotic situation in 
Northeast Florida ensured that the strategic situation would constantly be in flux. 
Unionists outside of the garrisoned city of St. Augustine were still exposed, but Union 
troops inside garrisoned St. Augustine, were secure from direct attack. 
Under the protection of Union gunboats, Confederates could only watch as Union 
troops disembarked from their trips up the St. Johns River to raid, free slaves, and protect 
Unionists. As many small boats were destroyed on the St. Johns River by both sides, 
crossing Confederate forces into Northeast Florida from the Confederate frontier on the 
west bank became perilous, as gunboats could cut off these detachments of Confederate 
irregulars from their bases. Union troops were increasingly sent out farther into no-
man’s-land to raid and search for guerrillas. Confederates had already ravished no-man’s-
land when they forced the removal of disloyal southerners into the Confederate frontier. 
Now it was the turn of Confederate sympathizers in no-man’s-land’s to suffer. This 
occurred when stern though liberal orders were issued from Major-General David Hunter 
on June 20, 1862. These orders allowed Union forces to expel any civilians who refused 
to take the oath of allegiance and to heavily iron and imprison any guerrilla that was 
captured. Though General Hunter forbade the death penalty for captured guerrillas, he did 
suggest the arming of African Americans and Native Americans to thwart any further 
attacks against loyal civilians in and around St. Augustine. 93  
On the west bank of the St. Johns River near Palatka and on the east and west 
bank south of Welaka, lay the Confederate frontier. Ash claims that this zone of 
occupation was occasionally subject to U.S. Army raids but rarely under sustained Union 
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occupation and subject to Confederate authority. Due to the lack of manpower not just in 
the Department of the South, but all over Union-occupied territory, the Union could not 
hold effective control of this region of the Confederate frontier. Instead, Union forces 
were held up in garrisoned towns and could only travel as far around these bastions of 
Union control as their horses, ships, or legs would take them. This left an area outside of 
regular Union patrols with little-to-no Union control. However, this did not prevent the 
Confederate frontier from being penetrated by Union forces with enough supplies and 
transportation. In Northeast Florida, this Confederate frontier followed the east and west 
bank of the St. Johns River, south to Picolata and Gainesville and the Confederate interior 
to the west of Palatka.94  
Any attempt to push across the St. Johns River required a strong force and reliable 
transportation to achieve the objective. However, these were the two things that St. 
Augustine’s garrison lacked during its early occupation.95 Writing to Quartermaster 
General M. C. Meigs Brigadier General H. W. Benham stated, “Land transportation as 
horses, mules, and wagons, your department has not furnished us, and they could have 
been but of limited use if you had. Our only means of movement therefore for attack or 
defense is by vessels, and they must be steamers.”96 General Benham saw the strategic 
problems of the Department of the South. It was too big, had too many places to blockade 
or occupy to prevent blockade-runners, and the entire department crawled with 
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Confederate cavalry, partisans, and guerrillas. Only armed steamers could safely 
transport men in substantial force to dissuade most attacks by Confederate irregulars who 
were attempting to deny the Union control of the St. Johns River and Northeast Florida.  
Town’s that bordered no-man’s-land and the Confederate frontier that had once 
been commercial connections between coastal cities like St. Augustine and Florida’s 
interior were not spared the economic dislocation that affected garrisoned towns. For 
instance, Picolata became a desolate town and by the end of the war, only two houses 
remained standing out of the half dozen that had survived the Second Seminole War. 
Supplies from Florida’s interior were shut off as U.S. Navy gunboats in the area guarded 
against Confederate troops and supplies crossing into Northeast Florida. Though Picolata 
would be periodically occupied by Union troops after the summer of 1863, its value as an 
economic connection to St. Augustine ceased to exist.97 
With Picolata cut off from St. Augustine, the Ancient City’s only income came 
from the meager trade between citizens in no-man’s-land, or in town with Union troops. 
This trade between soldiers and civilians was easily interrupted. Supplies were scarce as a 
result of the few U.S. Navy transports coming into St. Augustine, which also led to the 
inconsistent pay for Union troops. In fact the payment of Union troops was so 
inconsistent that months could pass without soldiers receiving compensation, further 
depriving the garrisoned town of income.98 
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Ash states that as the summer of 1862 waned, attacks on Unionists, the defiance 
of southerners, and the danger to U.S. troops, caused Union officers across the occupied 
South to run out of patience. Local commanders had wide latitude in exercising their 
authority. Generals like Benjamin Butler and William Tecumseh Sherman often 
instigated policies without clear direction from Washington, based solely on their 
understanding of the strategic situation and local population’s loyalty. This is another 
default in Ash’s study, as he paints a oversimplified transition between conciliation and 
hard war. Historian Mark Grimsley states that there was no clear transition between 
conciliation, pragmatism, and hard war policies that occurred after 1863. Department 
commanders, judging events on the ground, often created policies which fell between 
conciliation and hard war. Military necessity, reprisals, and lack of discipline, among 
other things, could influence how occupation played out locally.  In the end, policies or 
procedures of occupation first enacted by Union troops were often later adopted by the 
U.S. government.99 
Union soldiers went through stages in their actions and adapted to their 
interactions with southern civilians, ranging from conciliation to subjugation. Some 
southern civilians remained defiant, even if it was not through overt military means. 
However, actions towards southern civilians were never uniform and the application of 
even basic orders could receive some startlingly different results. For instance, U.S. 
conciliatory policy in 1862 stipulated that cooperating southerners could petition garrison 
                                                                                                                                                 
10, December 5, 6, 21, 1862; this fits with Ash’s assertions that garrisoned towns often had supply issues 
and high inflation, which forced U.S. forces to care for civilians inside the town Ash, When the Yankees 
Came, 77-83, 86, 88. 
99 Ash does note that there are inconsistencies in conciliation but does not explore this point further, Ash, 
When the Yankees Came, 57. For wide latitude among Union commanders see: Gabriel, “The American 
Experience with Military Government,” 637; Futrell, “Federal Military Government in the South, 1861-
1865,” 181. For Mark Grimsley’s assertion that there was no clear transition to hard war, see: Grimsley, 
Hard Hand of War, 1-6, 13, 15, 35, 155. 
 54 
commanders for the return of their slaves if the slave had fled into Union lines. 
Departmental commanders did not uniformly uphold this policy. For example, Colonel 
Bell of the Fourth New Hampshire was arrested in July 1862 for violating Major-General 
David Hunter’s orders not to return any slaves to their masters.100  
Colonel Bell believed the charges were because of the actions of his provost 
marshal, who had expelled a group of African American women after labeling them 
“prostitutes.” As no owner had come forth requesting their return, the provost marshal 
was also in violation of U.S. policy on returning slaves. Bell, in a letter to his wife and 
later to the editor of the Independent Democrat, a newspaper in New Hampshire that 
spread rumors about Bell’s conduct, claimed that he had never ordered the returning of 
any slaves, only the removal of those “prostitutes” of the town who posed a danger to the 
health of his men. Writing home to his wife, he explained that, “I feel easy for […] I have 
tried to conscientiously do my duty towards the negroes according to my best judgment 
setting them free whenever I could and making their bondage less hard when I could not 
free them.” Hunter, an avid abolitionist, clearly disagreed.101 
Writing months later, A. H. Young commented on the treatment that African 
Americans and white St. Augustinians received from the Fourth New Hampshire. Young 
stated that “Bell is as true a man as I am” but his officers were abusive towards African 
Americans. These “pro slavery officers” complained that they fought “for union and the 
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constitution as it was” not on the question of “if they considered a negro as good as a 
white man.”102 Young then went on to describe how in one instance when Colonel Bell 
was away, Brigadier-General Rufus Saxton, a commander under General Hunter, visited 
the town and was “mobbed in regular southern style by soldiers who should have 
protected him” because the general tried to impose loose restrictions on African 
Americans’ ability to move inside St. Augustine “as they pleased.”103  
The latitude given to regiments and departmental commanders not only created 
substantial inconsistencies in the ways that particular Union regiments dealt with 
southern civilians and African Americans in St. Augustine, but also affected the issue of 
expulsions which occurred across the occupied South. During the stay of the Fourth New 
Hampshire, limited expulsions of Confederates occurred. However, these initial 
deportations would be small in comparison to the large expulsions to come under the 
Seventh New Hampshire. These expulsions occurred after a Unionist was murdered 
outside of town in September 1862. Union forces initiated a policy of requiring southern 
civilians to take the oath of allegiance or be forced outside the lines. Such a policy had 
actually been in effect since June 20, 1862, when General Hunter granted Colonel Bell 
liberal orders to expel anyone outside the town regardless of sex due to resistance and 
rising guerrilla violence. However, these measures were never adopted under the Fourth 
New Hampshire. Only with the arrival of the Seventh New Hampshire did southern 
civilians with family members serving in the Confederate army find themselves deprived 
of their homes and either forced into strange quarters or transported out of St. Augustine 
                                                 
102 A. H. Young to Susan, September 9, 1862, his emphasis. 
103 A. H. Young to Susan, September 9, 1862. 
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altogether, destined for Fernandina, Florida or Hilton Head, South Carolina.104 Ash’s 
model is also insufficient when dealing with the decision to expel Confederate 
sympathizers from garrisoned towns. Ash describes expulsions as common from 1863 on, 
but does not discuss them in great detail in late 1862, when they occurred in the 
Department of the South. This makes St. Augustine unique and represents another flaw 
with Ash’s model.105  
Many times Union troops were ahead of the administration in terms of 
implementing policy on the ground. This was true of Union soldiers in St. Augustine who 
with General Hunter’s blessing, had early on abandoned conciliation for “hard war.”106 
Hard war, a term first adopted by historian Bruce Catton, is a specific form of warfare 
that strategically targets not just military personnel and material, but also civilian 
property thereby denying materials for the enemy army. Historian Mark Grimsley 
popularized the term hard war in his work on Union military policy and distinguished it 
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from “total war.” Citing historian Mark E. Neely, Jr.’s work on “total war” in the Civil 
War, Grimsley agreed with Neely’s assertion that the Civil War was not a total war 
because, “the essential aspect of any definition of total war asserts that it breaks down the 
distinction between soldiers and civilians, combatants and noncombatants, and this no 
one in the Civil War did systemically, including William T. Sherman.”107 Though the 
Civil War was not a total war with indiscriminate killing and plundering, Union forces 
after 1863 dropped the policy commonly known as conciliation. This policy respected 
loyal southerners’ property, in the hopes of maintaining the loyalty of the border slave 
states.108  
In 1862, conciliation was still Union policy, but several episodes in the occupied 
South show that soldiers simply conducted reprisals when threatened and attacked. For 
example, Charles A. Cressy in the Fourth New Hampshire Volunteers described how the 
men of his regiment destroyed property often frequented by guerrillas. After being called 
out on the “long roll” because of an alarm, the regiment went inside Fort Marion and 
shelled the woods and fields surrounding the city. Afterwards, two companies went out 
three miles from St. Augustine to the Fairbanks house and discovered horses that had 
been left behind by the Confederate irregular troops. As a consequence of this, troops 
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from another company in the Fourth New Hampshire marched out of St. Augustine the 
following day and tore down the Fairbanks house and then took whatever goods and 
furniture they could carry away.109   
These actions on July 17-18, 1862 preceded any official War Department policy 
that advocated the targeting of southern property. However, these actions came on the 
heels of General Hunter’s orders concerning goods, slaves, and civilians in the 
Department of the South issued on June 20, 1862.110 These Union soldiers were 
frustrated by months of garrison duty, false alarms, and harassment by guerrillas. In 
response to these stresses, U.S. soldiers took it upon themselves to tear down the 
Fairbanks house and plunder the goods inside. This reprisal was not solely done out of 
revenge but also to remove any shelter or point of organization for Confederate guerrillas 
operating on the east bank of the St. John’s River.111 Unfortunately, no records survive of 
the action in the official records, which explains why previous authors have not recorded 
this early example of reprisals by frustrated Union troops. Calvin Shedd from the Seventh 
New Hampshire Volunteers corroborates the story. In a letter to his wife, Shedd 
described a skirmish in the vicinity of St. Augustine and mentions “the remains of the 
Fairbanks house,” which “our soldiers”—meaning soldiers from the Fourth New 
Hampshire—“had burnt.”112 
As occupation progressed, this defiance held consequences for men and women in 
the town. Defiance and opposition to taking the oath of allegiance led to the expulsions of 
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hundreds of men, women, and children from the town. In addition, wide latitude could 
also bring about inconsistency in actions towards southern civilians. On October 12-16, 
1862, Calvin Shedd outlined what he felt were some of the differences between the 
relations of the citizens with the Fourth and Seventh New Hampshire,  
The Citizens liked the 4th first rate for they used to abuse the Niggers & let the 
whites do just as they pleased, let them pass out in the lines pretty much as they 
liked when the 7th came here everything is changed Abbot & Put(nam) just made 
the Men & Women take the Oath of Allegiance or go outside the Lines, it made 
an awfull Growl, but it was no use they had to take it, quite a number of the 
women had to go, their Husbands being in the Rebel Army they were Rebel too & 
had to leave. I dont think there is a real hearty Union man in Town, they take the 
oath for convenience sake, so they can stay at home.113 
With the departure of the Fourth New Hampshire from St. Augustine in September 1862, 
the Seventh New Hampshire took over occupation duty of the Ancient City. Colonel 
Haldimand S. Putnam, learning from the example General Hunter made of Putnam’s 
predecessor Colonel Bell, and frustrated by continued resistance, implemented Hunter’s 
harsher policy that required the population to take the oath of allegiance or be forcibly 
expelled.114  
When orders arrived in town from Hilton Head, the town’s population, age 
fourteen and up, was crowded into the Presbyterian Church for the purposes of signing 
the oath of allegiance. Once there the assembled was addressed by a member of the 
provost guard, "I do not know whether to address you (alluding to the ladies present), as 
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ladies or women, as all Broadway crinolined women are called ladies!"115 After 
announcing the purpose of the meeting and collecting the signatures of those who took 
the oath, the remaining southern civilians were registered as disloyal and told to prepare 
for “a free ride” into rebeldom. This expulsion had come at the behest of General Rufus 
Saxton, acting commander while General Hunter was being relieved.116  
Several hundred women and children were transported out of St. Augustine in 
mid-September 1862, and A. H. Young described his return from guarding a group of 
them onboard the steamer Burnside bound for Hilton Head. Young was detailed to 
accompany the refugees who had dubbed the event the “anti-loyal female expedition to 
St. Johns River.” Young told “the wealthy people of St. Augustine” who were all “of 
course indignant” that he was detailed to them because of his good looks and on the 
account of his blood that came from “one of the finest families in the north” and he 
would “compensate for the badness of the ship.”117 His efforts appeared to have returned 
the “good nature” of the ladies onboard, though he then admits that he should have just 
saved his breath since soon thereafter, all of the refugees succumbed to seasickness, 
destroying their remaining “good nature.”118 Young joked “I am happy to say that about 
all the best looking girls remained […] I will write more about this. Some of the scenes 
were very comical.”119 
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News of the expulsions was reported in southern newspapers like the Charleston 
Mercury, which described the deportations of families from St. Augustine. The paper 
reports that “The steamer left for the St. John's River with some fifty families--about 150 
women and children huddled together, without a bed to rest on, or any accommodations 
whatever, and kept two and a half days outside without food or water save what they took 
with them, and in their sea sickness were refused even water to drink.”120  
These expulsions by Union forces were conducted with little to no warning to the 
citizens of St. Augustine; from martial law being declared under the Fourth New 
Hampshire Volunteers to forced deportations under the Seventh New Hampshire 
Volunteers, these wartime measures shattered the antebellum community as Ash 
describes in his work. During a very short time period, Shedd and other officers estimated 
that Union forces removed around three hundred people from the town and transported to 
places like Fernandina or Hilton Head. No records detailing the remaining population in 
December 1862 exist. Only the letters of Sam Walcott, a company clerk for the Seventh 
Connecticut, provide an estimation of the town’s remaining population at around 700 
whites and 300 African Americans in mid-1863. Both Confederate and Union troops 
were displacing hundreds of civilians, and while it is not yet clear what became of all 
these refugees, several military records and correspondence indicate that some St. 
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Augustinians tried to return to their city, even crossing through the dangerous and 
desolate wasteland of no-man’s-land to do so.121  
This chapter has shown that Ash’s model of occupation works for St. Augustine 
during the early period. St. Augustine was a garrisoned town, surrounded by a violent and 
menacing no-man’s-land where irregular forces persecuted Unionists and frustrated 
Union troops. This no-man’s-land ran up to the St. Johns River by 1863 and was 
bordered by the Confederate frontier which stretched from the western side of the St. 
Johns River to Florida’s interior. In St. Augustine, as with the rest of the occupied South, 
both violent and non-violent resistance led to frustration and conflict, which shaped the 
progression of occupation in garrisoned towns, resulting in the gradual abandonment of 
the conciliatory policy for hard war. Defiance, once greeted with bemusement, eventually 
was greeted with arrests and forced expulsions of Confederate families, sympathizers, 
and those who the Union army no longer cared to feed. Lastly, these events of occupation 
shattered the antebellum community, leading to demographic change with the expulsions 
of white southerners and the influx of African American and white refugees. This all 
applies to the garrisoned town of St. Augustine where defiance resulted in expulsions and 
the driving out of over three hundred white residents, significantly changing the city from 
its antebellum condition.  
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 CHAPTER THREE: ASH’S OCCUPATION MODEL IN THE LATE 
OCCUPATION PEROD, 1863-1865 
This chapter will briefly discuss St. Augustine’s condition at the start of 1863. 
This will highlight the changes to St. Augustine in its first year under Union control by 
illustrating the physical scars that occupation left on the town. Then this chapter will 
discuss Ash’s zones of occupation in the late period by covering the changes and 
expansion of no-man’s-land around St. Augustine because of the inner blockade. Next, 
this chapter will show that Ash’s assertions that Confederate irregulars’ harassment of 
Union patrols and persecution of Unionists in no-man’s-land increased after 1863 applies 
to the countryside surrounding St. Augustine. Then this chapter will discuss how 
garrisoned towns served as beacons of freedom for African Americans and as a result 
were targeted by Confederate generals, though the unique topography of Northeast 
Florida prevented large-scale assaults. Though major assaults would never be adopted, 
continued guerrilla war would rage in no-man’s-land and on the St. Johns River. These 
attacks resulted in further expansions of no-man’s-land as Union soldiers spread out 
across Northeast Florida in an attempt to protect Unionists. Lastly, this chapter will detail 
the strength of Union control, the breakdown of Confederate resistance, and will 
highlight the changes to the antebellum community that Ash describes from mid-1863 to 
the end of the war, evidenced in a massive demographic shift.  
Ash contends that garrisoned towns across the occupied South, like St. Augustine 
at the start of 1863, were a shell of their former selves. Many businesses were closed, 
food was short, roads in disrepair, and the population was significantly smaller. In 
January 1863, citing concerns over short supplies and the fact that white southern 
families had relatives in the rebel army, Union forces again evicted a large number of 
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people from the town. The expulsions that took place in 1863 appear to have been 
conducted in a more orderly fashion than the September 1862 expulsion. However, they 
were still shocking and traumatic for white southerners. One unwelcomed shock for 
white southerners was both black and white troops guarding the transports that took these 
women to Fernandina and elsewhere, which was viewed as an insult by southern 
refugees. Second Lieutenant Calvin Shedd of Company A, Seventh New Hampshire 
Volunteers, described the lamentations of the women in town and their remonstrance at 
being forced out. Even with the scenes of heartbreak at families being forced from their 
homes, Shedd stated “the Women have been awfull bitter on us & I dont pity them,” 
despite the fact that they would be thrust “out in Rebeldom where it is morraly certain 
they will suffer for food & clothing. but the sin & blame lays at the Doors of Rebels not 
us; as they sow they & their Families must reap. & the crop of Misery will be extremely 
large while Death is knocking at every door.”122 Many of these women verbally lashed 
out at abolitionist Union officers, who chided the women on the journey. After the 
expulsion, the number of whites in town numbered around 700 people, with 300 African 
Americans as well. By mid-1863, the population of St. Augustine was estimated at 400 to 
500 civilians as compared to 1,914 citizens that resided there in 1860.123 
Valentine Chamberlain of the Seventh Connecticut Volunteers upon visiting St. 
Augustine in February 1863 stated “the glory of this town has departed. The streets are 
desolate, the inhabitants of secesh proclivity [?] have been recently sent away.  The same 
day that we arrived about 80 left— more than half however were children. Some have left 
since.  The first lot were set over the lines from here. The men are mostly off in the rebel 
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army.”124 Union soldiers were more or less responsible for the damage done inside the 
garrisoned city. In late February 1863, Calvin Shedd reported that soldiers broke into 
sutler shops, vandalized the stores, and stole over one hundred dollars’ worth of 
merchandise.125 
Though St. Augustine obviously bore the scares of occupation, the town was not 
completed destroyed or pillaged. Sam Walcott of the Seventh Connecticut found a great 
many “bananas & a few date trees and the woods all about is full of the sour or wild 
oranges.” Valentine Chamberlain managed to find a good supply of lettuce and peas in 
town. Both soldiers confirm that the growing season helped alleviate some of the supply 
issues inside the garrisoned town.126 As occupation settled, despite the expulsions of 
citizens and the damage done by soldiers, the garrisoned city found some semblance of 
order and balance that only the Union army could ensure. Sam Walcott remarked that the 
Catholic cathedral chimed its bells and held service every day. This shows that St. 
Augustine suffered less destruction than what Ash described in other garrisoned towns. 
However, on the whole, garrisoned towns were damaged far less than no-man’s-land, and 
churches were only able to operate on a regular basis inside garrisoned towns.127  
By the beginning of 1863, the relationship between garrisoned towns, no-man’s-
land, and the Confederate frontier had changed. The St. Johns River was under an “inner 
blockade” by Union gunboats off Mayport Mills and Union steamers regularly traveled 
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up to Palatka, Welaka, and beyond in the hunt for blockade-runners. In addition, Union 
units travelled greater distances from St. Augustine out beyond the pickets for firewood 
because foragers had consumed all the lumber surrounding the city. This task became 
more dangerous as the expulsions that occurred across the occupied South were often 
followed by threats of retaliation from Confederate and irregular forces. This is also true 
for St. Augustine, where the expulsions of defiant St. Augustinians by Union forces 
elicited a response from Confederate forces, who began to cross the St. John’s River in 
force and increase attacks because their families were now gone.128  
George Buker in his work on the Union’s inner blockade argued that St. 
Augustine’s quiet occupation experience was due to the blockade of St. Johns River. He 
contends that these gunboats made Confederate irregulars cautious about crossing onto 
the east bank of the river for fear of being cut off from their bases. However, St. 
Augustine was by no means quiet and despite the Union’s gunboats, no-man’s-land 
would continue to be dangerous for Union soldiers and Unionists. With many southern 
families no longer in St. Augustine, guerrillas were free to harass Union troops at will. 
Traveling outside of a garrisoned town during the late occupation period was dangerous 
without large well-armed parties, as many soldiers around St. Augustine would soon find 
out. In early January 1863, three men, including a lieutenant, were captured less than ten 
miles outside of town by Confederate cavalry. 129 
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Of course, it was not just U.S. soldiers who had to fear attack from Confederate 
irregulars. The violence of Confederate irregulars against Unionists or those Floridians 
who did not directly aid the Confederate cause is evidenced in the writings of Calvin 
Shedd. Shedd reported that a man came over the lines on February 8, 1863, and told the 
soldiers of the Seventh New Hampshire that guerrillas had come to his house, robbed him 
of over a hundred dollars, and murdered his son who refused to go with them.130 Shedd 
lamented that Union soldiers could not give protection to those neutral civilians out in no-
man’s-land, who were subjected to the deprivations of Confederate guerrillas. “I wish we 
might just get hold of them [Confederates] for a few minutes.” Even better in Shedd’s 
opinion would be if the rebels actually attacked the city, so they could get “a taste of [the] 
old fort.”131 
The debacle that befell the Seventh New Hampshire in March 1863 is another 
example of the danger that no-man’s-land contained. On March 11-15, 1863 Calvin 
Shedd described a great “excitement” around St. Augustine. According to the statements 
of Colonel Putnam and Lieutenant Colonel Abbot in the Official Records of the War of 
the Rebellion, Captain Dickison and around eighty of his men attacked the advanced 
picket of the Seventh New Hampshire two miles outside of town. In response Colonel 
Putnam sent out Lieut. Col. Abbott with over 120 men to attack Dickison’s camp. 
Abbott’s attack was discovered before they could reach the Confederate camp and the 
Dickison’s men retired under the cover of scattered fire from their rear guard. Again we 
see the importance of cavalry here for the security of foragers leaving garrisoned towns 
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into no-man’s-land. St. Augustine for much of its occupation lacked any cavalry. This 
limited the effective control that Union forces could have in no-man’s-land. More 
important, as Dickison’s men were mounted, Lieut. Col. Abbott was not able to 
effectively pursue. The whole affair led to the capture of one Union sergeant and four 
enlisted men.132  
Despite the dangers that existed in no-man’s-land, garrisoned towns could be 
places of limited normality. The Seventh Connecticut and Forty-Eighth New York had 
passed their time in St. Augustine relatively quietly, with the occasional raid on rebel 
cattle breaking the peace. Charles Briggs, a surgeon in the convalescent hospital at St. 
Augustine partook in nightly social events with pretty young ladies, lived in a well-
furnished house, and ate fine food at the Magnolia House.133 The start of the Twenty-
Fourth Massachusetts and Tenth Connecticut’s time in St. Augustine followed this 
pattern. However, normality did not mean that the town was prosperous. The regimental 
history of the Twenty-Fourth Massachusetts states that barely 500 people were present in 
St. Augustine during 1863, and they were almost entirely dependent on the U.S. 
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government for rations. Major Dudley W. Strickland of the Forty-Eighth New York 
confirmed this in his correspondence, stating that until the growing season started, little 
food stuffs could be produced, as well as there were no stores in town were provisions 
could be bought. He added copious notes detailing the feeding of the destitute 
population.134  
Garrisoned towns were often too strong to be attacked directly by irregular forces, 
but with their presence as beacons for African American self-emancipation, many 
Confederates realized that something had to be done to prevent the drain of manpower 
from no-man’s-land and the Confederate frontier to garrisoned towns. Confederate 
generals like P. G. T. Beauregard, commander of the Confederate Department of South 
Carolina, Georgia, and Florida, inquired about assaults on St. Augustine and Fernandina. 
Confederate generals in the area, including General Joseph Finegan, commander of the 
Department of East Florida, recognized the strengths of the garrisoned towns, but also 
their vulnerability given the long distances between garrisons and the lack of viable 
transportation necessary for quickly massing men to defend against an assault. These 
Confederate generals also recognized that St. Augustine and Fernandina served as what 
Beauregard’s chief of staff Thomas Jordan described as “abolition garrisons,” or places 
that were sapping the strength of the Confederate war effort by enticing slaves to run 
away and seek protection from U.S. forces. Ash states how Confederates attempted to 
curb black freedom by trying to isolate these garrisoned towns as much as possible.135  
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From the outset of the war, Confederate forces had struggled to maintain a 
presence on the east bank of the St. Johns River to disrupt Union foraging parties into no-
man’s-land and the Confederate frontier, to capture runaway slaves, and to prevent 
southern Unionists from aiding U.S. forces. Though J. J. Dickison’s cavalry was 
specifically deployed for this purpose and was effective in reducing these activities, his 
forces were insufficient for general assaults against garrisoned cities. However, with 
larger forces, generals like Beauregard contemplated the possibility of destroying the 
“abolition garrisons.” Responding on July 28, 1864, General Joseph Finegan informed 
chief of staff Jordan and General Beauregard of the inadvisability of direct assaults 
against St. Augustine and Fernandina. Such an attack was possible, but highly 
unadvisable, claimed Finegan. Not only did he lack the heavy siege guns necessary to 
attack Fort Marion, but also,  
the possession of Saint Augustine would be entirely useless to us so long as the 
enemy holds the Saint Johns River, by which he is able to cut off all 
communication that that town, except from a point so far south as to render the 
supplying of a garrison there next to impracticable.136  
Transportation through Northeast Florida, which was described as “one great pine forest” 
was difficult for both Union and Confederate forces.  
Ash’s model is both applicable and flawed when applied to this situation. Ash’s 
model is instructive, as it helps illustrate that zones of occupation were never uniform and 
were always subject to the amount of cavalry or river transportation available and how 
arduous it was to transverse the surrounding environment, i.e. rivers, swamps, or pine 
forests. With Union forces in virtual command of the St. Johns River, protracted exposure 
of large land forces in Northeast Florida would become untenable and a waste of 
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Confederate resources. This makes St. Augustine break with Ash’s larger model for two 
reasons. Ash does not detail major attempts to retake garrisoned cities by direct assault 
and instead focuses on the irregular warfare that permeated the occupied South. The role 
that topography, specifically the St. Johns River, played in major role in discouraging 
Confederate assaults against garrisoned towns, which is unique to Northeast Florida. This 
desire to destroy the Union’s hold on a specific garrisoned town, St. Augustine, is not 
entirely unique, as Confederates desired to retake Nashville in 1864.137  
With the proposed attack on St. Augustine rejected by General Finegan, St. 
Augustine continued to enjoy its peaceful respite from war. Like most cities in the 
occupied South, the local commander was engulfed in administrative paper work for the 
day to day running of the town. The commander of the post, Colonel Osborn, spent more 
time going over purchases and ration quotas, saying, “I seem to have set up a retail 
grocery store without any profits.”138 In addition to this large amount of paperwork, 
residents trying to make his acquaintance, or asking to go outside the lines or bring in a 
relative from outside, or requesting for their property or his protection regularly 
interrupted the Colonel. Union troops did not stay idle for long; soldiers partook in the 
occasional raid into the no-man’s-land around St. Augustine, like one on November 9, 
1863, which returned with twenty-five head of cattle, soothing the hunger of the soldiers 
in town with ample roast beef.139  
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Union troops would have to go farther and farther into no-man’s-land from 
garrisoned St. Augustine to obtain supplies and firewood. This exposed foraging parties 
to possible attacks from Dickison’s cavalry. Thanksgiving and Christmas passed without 
signs of attack and Union troops and Unionist civilians enjoyed splendid celebrations 
with festivities and food that was enjoyed by all.140 However, 1863 would end in tragedy 
for the Twenty-Fourth Massachusetts and Tenth Connecticut. On December 30, 1863 a 
party of woodchoppers about two miles outside of St. Augustine in no-man’s-land were 
attacked by Dickison’s cavalry, with twenty four men captured and several others killed 
by the Confederates.141  
The lack of cavalry and the inability to penetrate deep into no-man’s-land and the 
Confederate frontier in the first years of occupation, continued throughout the war, 
further exacerbating the strategic situation of Northeast Florida. As Colonel Francis A. 
Osborn of the Twenty-Fourth Massachusetts stated on January 1, 1864, “If I had a 
company of cavalry, I am confident I could have overtaken them [Confederate 
irregulars], and not only have rescued my own men, but also have captured some besides, 
for from their trail they were mounted on small horses.”142 This became especially 
problematic when Union forces began occupying Picolata and Palatka, which created 
more garrisoned towns capable of projecting effective Union control, spreading no-
man’s-land across Northeast Florida. This again illustrates the fluidity of no-man’s-land, 
which saw both U.S. and Confederate raids during the late occupation period. While the 
Confederate frontier on the west side of the St. Johns River only received cursory raids 
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during 1863, Union encroachment would grow as more and more forces were transported 
to Florida for the greatest concentration of troops and the largest battle Florida would see 
in the Civil War. 
As Union soldiers concentrated in Jacksonville and Baldwin, and Confederate 
forces concentrated west of Lake City in the weeks leading up to the Battle of Olustee, St. 
Augustine’s garrison was used to further disrupt beef supplies and put Confederate troops 
on guard, in hopes of keeping them disoriented as to the direction of the Unions’ main 
invasion route into Middle Florida. On February 7, 1864, 200 men from the Twenty-
Fourth Massachusetts left St. Augustine and crossed the St. Johns River. They returned to 
the Ancient City with two rebel soldiers, a civilian who had sugar for Dickison’s cavalry, 
and forty-five head of cattle. This was the last major raid conducted by the Twenty-
Fourth Massachusetts and Tenth Connecticut during their stay in St. Augustine. The 
majority of both regiments was transferred to Baldwin and Jacksonville and would join 
the rest of the army there as it prepared to move towards Lake City and the Confederate 
interior.143 
This raid also illustrates the problems caused by Union soldiers pillaging farms 
and homes in no-man’s-land during cattle raids. In this instance, the officer in charge of 
the raid paid farmers for the produce taken by his soldiers. Even at this stage in the war, 
some Union officers were conciliatory to southern civilians. This stands in stark contrast 
to the depredations that officers of the Fourth and Seventh New Hampshire allowed 
during their time around St. Augustine early in the war, when official Union policy was 
against such acts of aggression on civilian property. Ash mentions that some northerners 
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debated the constitutionality of a hard policy, but he never states that some officers or 
soldiers did not engage in hard war even after 1864.144 
After the U.S. debacle at Olustee on February 20, 1864, Union forces retreated 
from their advanced positions back to the safety of the garrisoned towns of Jacksonville, 
Fernandina, and St. Augustine. Though Confederate forces had stopped Union forces 
from holding a permanent stronghold on the west bank of the St. Johns River, they failed 
to follow up their victory, allowing U.S. soldiers to further regroup and entrench in their 
garrisoned towns. Both Union and Confederate troops poured into Florida during the late 
days of February and early March with around 10,000 Union troops stationed in the 
Florida in the weeks after the battle.145 Despite the relatively large Union Army in 
Florida, St. Augustine, which was left with only two companies during the Olustee 
campaign, was still too weak to project Union power into the Confederate frontier and 
beyond.  
Ash discusses at length how Unionists were the most susceptible during periods 
of time in which large concentrations of Union and Confederate forces remained miles 
apart. This distance did not stop Confederate irregulars and Union troops from laying 
waste to no-man’s-land in between them. One such instance of this appears on April 26, 
1864, when a force of 400 Confederate cavalry crossed onto the east side of the St. Johns 
River for the purpose of arresting the local Union men and to confiscate all their horses, 
cattle, and provisions. Thirty Unionists attempted to flee for St. Augustine, but seventeen 
were caught and summarily hanged on the spot. This blatant war crime enraged U.S. 
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officials, who immediately began organizing regular patrols in force from Jacksonville to 
Picolata, with a substantial portion of St. Augustine’s garrison participating in these 
sweeps.146 
As a result, Union forces fanned out across no-man’s-land in Northeast Florida 
until the end of the war. The Seventeenth Connecticut during this time guarded St. 
Augustine, while the Seventy-Fifth Ohio Volunteers, the First South Carolina, the Thirty-
Fifth Colored Infantry and other units, patrolled Northeast Florida. This dispersal’s goal 
was to spread Union protection across Northeast Florida, in an attempt to stop 
Confederate cavalry and irregulars from harassing the Unionist population. Union troops 
set out routinely from Jacksonville and St. Augustine towards Palatka, Picolata, and other 
garrisoned towns on the St. Johns River. Union troops, both black and white, worked in 
close concert with each other, relying on their comrades to guard their flanks and rear as 
Union forces tried to thwart any Confederate movements in the area.  
Another consequence of the actions of Confederate irregulars, Union troops 
planned a raid into the Confederate frontier in response to Captain Dickison’s efforts to 
clear all the area in front of St. Augustine of Unionists.147 This was one of the deepest 
raids into the Confederate frontier and originated near St. Augustine. On April 26, 1864, 
General William Birney and the men of the First South Carolina Infantry, the Thirty-Fifth 
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Colored Infantry, and the One Hundred and Seventy-Fifth New York Mounted Infantry, 
boarded the U.S. steamers Mary Benton and Harriet Weed at Picolata near St. Augustine. 
With them was the U.S. gunboat Ottawa as protection and the expedition travelled down 
the St. Johns River all the way to Welaka, Florida. Once there, the troops confiscated 
molasses, freed slaves, burned cotton, requisitioned cattle, and protected Unionists, many 
of whom joined their ranks as scouts. Using the freed slaves as cattle drivers led by 
Unionist scouts, two to three droves of cattle, about 1,000 total, with a number of horses 
were sent just north of St. Augustine to graze in between there and Jacksonville.148 
 Confederates did not allow U.S. troops to operate uninhibited in no-man’s-land. 
The most powerful way to deny them dominance in this area was to take the fight to the 
river itself. Tired of the power of Union gunboats which prevented larger incursions into 
no-man’s-land, Confederates began lining the St. Johns River south of Jacksonville with 
“torpedoes,” or modern day naval mines chained to the floor of the river underneath the 
water’s surface. These deadly devices had an almost immediately impact. In less than two 
months, three Union ships were destroyed on the river with dozens dead, wounded, and 
captured.149  
Captain Dickison had another surprise in store for U.S. Navy gunboats, which had 
travelled the St. Johns River almost unmolested for the entire war—cannons. In May 
1864, south of Palatka, Dickison and his men waited for the U.S. gunboat Columbine to 
pass by. Taking aim with their field pieces, the Confederates opened fire, destroying the 
propeller and raking the deck with grapeshot. After several minutes of effective fire, the 
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gunboat struck its colors, with a total loss of twenty dead and sixty-five wounded.150 
Despite these few successes, the Confederate frontier would continue to be raided and no-
man’s-land in Northeast Florida was coming under tighter and tighter Union control. 
As the war dragged on, Ash states that Union control increased as Confederate 
control broke down. An indication of the strength of Union control in 1864 can be seen in 
the writings of John C. Gray, Jr., who stated “the people of the east side of the St. Johns 
are called Florida Yankees and the majority of them are Union men.”151 Confederates 
recognized this issue, noting that it caused them many problems concerning military 
intelligence. Confederate Major General Patton Anderson was discouraged by the fact 
that once Union troops crossed into Northeast Florida, he was completely unable to 
account for their movements to reinforce either Jacksonville or St. Augustine. The no-
man’s-land between Jacksonville, St. Augustine, and Picolata was “wholly within the 
enemy’s possession and […] it was impossible to keep ourselves well advised of all his 
movements on that side of the river.”152 
Confederate resistance was breaking down in Northeast Florida and Confederate 
ability to raid around St. Augustine was significantly curtailed. Union commanders were 
so confident of their security that they began contemplating moving their heavy artillery 
out of Fort Marion in St. Augustine to Jacksonville or Palatka, “as St. Augustine cannot 
be approached by any force except small squads of cavalry.”153 With this security, St. 
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Augustine began exporting beef that was gathered in no-man’s-land in Northeast Florida 
for the purpose of feeding the rest of the Department of the South.154 
Despite the extension of Union troops into no-man’s-land, Captain Dickison 
continued to harass Union troops on the east bank of the St. Johns River. Justus M. 
Silliman, a soldier in the Seventeenth Connecticut Volunteers who served in St. 
Augustine, Jacksonville, and Volusia, Florida, detailed how his regiment was spread out 
across Northeast Florida, leaving it open to attack from Dickison’s cavalry. This is also 
unique to St. Augustine, as Ash states that it was uncommon for Union troops to spread 
out over large geographic areas.155  
Despite these sweeps of Union forces, Confederate cavalry still managed to cross 
to the east side of the St. Johns River and wreak havoc wherever they went. Even though 
officers knew of the danger of leaving a garrisoned town unescorted, such risks became 
more and more frequent as Union forces attempted to control all of Northeast Florida. 
However, this net of Union troops may have led some officers to become too relaxed and 
careless as many Union officers attended dances and socials outside the lines with 
growing frequency. Security was becoming so lax, that even Colonel William H. Noble 
of the Seventeenth Connecticut was captured by rebel forces while on a carriage ride on 
the Jacksonville Road; Noble was accompanied only by one other unarmed officer and a 
few ladies.156 
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Ash argues that by this time civilian resistance was dropping precipitously and 
war weariness was taking effect. In late 1863, Union soldiers and government agents 
reported the many of the South’s population were tired of the war and eager to rejoin the 
Union. Seeking to begin a process of reconciliation, Abraham Lincoln issued the 
Amnesty and Reconstruction proclamation on December 8, 1863. This allowed states that 
had joined the Confederacy to re-enter the Union, if ten percent of the state’s 1860 voting 
population would take the oath of allegiance. Led to believe that loyal citizens in 
southern states could easily match this quota, politicians quickly used the well-
intentioned act to fulfill their own designs. One such man who used these reports of 
widespread demoralization was the head of the Florida Direct Tax Commission Lyman 
Stickney. Stickney convinced Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase to begin 
attempts to create a new state government. Seeking to challenge Lincoln in the coming 
election, Chase sent Stickney to Northeast Florida to gauge the feasibility of organizing a 
state government.157  
On December 19, 1863, a Unionist meeting in St. Augustine put forward a series 
of resolutions that repudiated the rebellion and called for a process to readmit Florida as a 
state. As part of this process, Stickney began a sale of homes belonging to Confederate 
families for delinquent taxes on December 21, 1863. The sales were moderately 
successful, occurring over a week, and raised $19,329 in cash. These sales were also 
deemed illegal by other members of the Florida Direct Sales Tax Commission for not 
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publicizing them and for not waiting the required period of time, as well as for the 
number of corrupt agents who purchased real estate for themselves in town. Stickney 
himself bought a lot in St. Augustine and began fixing it up while other commissioners 
purchased a lot for Lincoln’s secretary, John Hay.158  
As the Union presence in Northeast Florida increased with the efforts to organize 
the state, officials and business interests in St. Augustine began showcasing themselves 
as model examples of pro-Union feeling. The Emancipation Proclamation celebration 
was one such showcase; with bands, banners, speeches, and meals attended by whites and 
freed slaves alike. But such displays could not prevent the recognition of the political 
reality. John Hay, Lincoln’s secretary, travelled through Northeast Florida with the goal 
of obtaining 1,100 signatures required to establish ten percent of the loyal population. In 
St. Augustine alone, Hay and others managed to collect 446 signatures. However, Hay’s 
efforts ended when Confederate General Joseph Finegan turned back Union General 
Thomas Seymour‘s army at Olustee on February 20, 1864.159 
As part of the move to organize Florida into a loyal state, a thorough count of 
occupied East Florida’s population was taken by Union authorities in early 1864. The 
federal military census of 1864 shows the massive population displacement that occurred 
during the Civil War in St. Augustine. The 1,914 residents of St. Augustine registered in 
                                                 
158 Smith, “Carpetbag Imperialism in Florida, Part II,” 267, 275-277, 280; Graham, The Awakening of St. 
Augustine, 128; Graham, “The Home Front,” 44; Nulty, Confederate Florida, 69-73; Schafer, Thunder on 
the River, 175-176. 
159 Smith, “Carpetbag Imperialism in Florida, Part II,” 288; Graham, “The Home Front,” 44; Nulty, 
Confederate Florida, 119; Florida State Genealogical Society, Census' department of the South, November, 
1864: for Jacksonville, Fernandina and St. Augustine, Florida: ordered by the Department of the South, 
Hilton Head, South Carolina. (Heritage Books, 2002): 170-225, (hereafter cited as, The Federal Military 
Census of 1864). The federal military census of 1864 has yet to be utilized in studies of Civil War St. 
Augustine, despite hundreds of pages of demographic data. The census includes the name, height, eyes, 
complexion, gender, age, place of birth or whether they were a contraband, last residence, former owner if 
applicable, date into the department, whether they had taken the oath of allegiance, rations given, and 
commanders’ comments. The census is not perfect. There are gaps in the information either to error or 
negligence, but the majority of the census is intact and provides a vivid view of St. Augustine in 1864. 
 81 
the U.S. census of 1860 declined to 1,436 in 1864, a twenty-five percent drop. In 
addition, of the 1,436 individuals recorded in the census, 996 were listed as original 
residents of St. Augustine or forty-eight percent of the original population.160  
Tracing the origins of many of the newcomers is difficult due to the incomplete 
records, but what can be discerned is that twenty-three northerners moved to St. 
Augustine between 1862-1864 from New York, Vermont, Rhode Island, and New Jersey. 
509 people on the census are listed as contrabands, this was the term written down for 
any black individual. That leaves 927 residents who are presumably regarded as white. 
Only 655 white civilians are listed as original residents of the town, far below the 1,175 
listed in the census of 1860, or forty-five percent of the original white population. Out of 
the 509 African Americans, 341 were listed as original residents. The census data makes 
clear that the number of African Americans who lived in St. Augustine in 1860 dropped 
from 739 individuals to 341 by 1864, a fifty-four percent drop. Out of the original 
residents of the town, whites were in the majority with fifty-one percent of the native 
population. Ash notes that whole communities were altered as many of the original 
inhabitants fled, were expelled, or were absent in Confederate service.161  
The twenty-five percent drop in the town’s total population is startling alone, but 
it pales in comparison to the forty-eight percent population drop of original residents of 
the town. Additionally, white original residents of the town fell by roughly forty-five 
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percent while African Americans fell by fifty-four percent. This drop in the town’s 
population can be corroborated by the testimony of soldiers like Calvin Shedd and A. H. 
Young of the Seventh New Hampshire, Sam Walcott, and news correspondents who 
witnessed the series of expulsions beginning in September 1862. What can explain this 
massive demographic change to St. Augustine? Firstly, the town’s population contributed 
ninety-nine individuals to the St. Augustine Blues, Company B, Third Florida Infantry. In 
addition, many wealthy St. Augustinians began leaving the city during the economic 
slump in the months leading up to the occupation. Union soldiers Shedd and Young 
recorded in their letters the forced expulsions of a number of St. Augustinians during the 
summer of 1862 and throughout 1863. Though a number did return, many did not due to 
selling off of their possessions or the hardships of travelling vast distances across no-
man’s-land. Lastly, many African Americans in East Florida joined the Union army and 
many of these recruits came from St. Augustine.162 
The incomplete information unfortunately leaves us with a fragmentary picture of 
the city’s African American population and arrival of refugees. For instance, 464 of the 
509 African Americans are listed with their slave-master’s names recorded in another 
column. Another fragmentary list shows 432 people residing in St. Augustine who are not 
listed as original residents of the city. Despite this large number of people, the 
fragmentary nature of the sources states that only 352 people or thirty-five percent of the 
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total population in St. Augustine have the date that they arrived in the Ancient City 
recorded from 1862 to 1864.163 
 The 1864 census details the amount of rations given out to the residents and 
refugees in St. Augustine. In May 1863, eighty-five white and sixty-seven black families 
were on government aid after fourteen months. Furthermore, historian Tracy J. Revels in 
her work on Florida women during the Civil War, places the total number of people 
receiving rations at 321, with an estimated total cost of $35,000 for the entire period.164 
Historian J. Britt McCarley in his work on the Quartermaster Department and Union 
soldiers’ rations, lists in detail the typical garrison ration. This consisted of twelve ounces 
of pork or bacon or a pound and four ounces of salt beef and a pound and a half of hard 
bread or a pound and six ounces of soft bread.165 In addition, for every one hundred 
rations, fifteen pounds of beans, ten pounds of rice, ten pounds of coffee, fifteen pounds 
of sugar, four quarts of vinegar, three pounds and twelve ounces of salt, and thirty pounds 
of potatoes (when practical). According to the 1864 census, 335 individuals received 
rations in February alone, with half or quarter rations going to most of the population, 
unless it was a mother with children. Union troops in St. Augustine were dolling out 236 
complete rations per day.166  
St. Augustine certainly proves Ash’s assertions that across the occupied South, 
the antebellum community was significantly changed by the years of war, deprivation, 
and dissatisfaction. The town was fed by U.S. troops from the time of its occupation 
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through the close of the war. Humanitarian efforts did not win over southerners and 
civilian resistance led to martial law, restrictions, and finally expulsions that rocked the 
community. It cannot be overstated how great the damage to the community was. 
Notwithstanding being one of the most stable occupation locations in the country, St. 
Augustine never-the-less suffered greatly during the war. Losing forty-eight percent of its 
original population with a loss of twenty-five percent in overall population numbers, the 
demographic shock to the community would be felt for the remainder of the decade.  
The final year of the war in 1865 did not pass by without incident. Months of 
occupation duty, the spreading out of Union forces across Northeast Florida from 
Jacksonville to Palatka, increased U.S. control to a greater extent than it ever had in 
Florida. Union gunboats controlled the St. Johns River, while U.S. raiding parties 
penetrated deep into no-man’s-land and the Confederate frontier, confiscating cattle, 
supplies, and assisting African Americans escaping to freedom. One raid did not end well 
for Lieutenant Colonel A. H. Wilkinson and his detachment of forty cavalrymen, sent to 
Volusia to confiscate cotton, as Captain Dickison’s men surprised them and captured the 
entire party.167 
The small skirmishes that occurred across Florida in the waning months did little 
to change the war’s outcome. By April 9, 1865, General Robert E. Lee had surrendered to 
Union forces, effectively ending major combat operations in Northern Virginia. Shortly 
after Lee’s surrender, John Wilkes Booth assassinated Abraham Lincoln at Ford’s 
Theatre. The two events occurred so close together that news of the surrender and 
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assassination reached St. Augustine on the same steamer.168 The Civil War in Florida 
officially closed on April 26, 1865, when General Joseph E. Johnston surrendered all 
forces in the Carolinas, Georgia, and Florida. With the close of the conflict, soldiers and 
civilians began thinking about the future and the coming struggle of rebuilding their lives. 
Andrew Anderson, a native of St. Augustine living in New York, lamented Lincoln’s 
death, fearing it would bring terrible retribution from the North on the South. Already 
disturbed with the death and destruction that the war had wrought, Anderson wrote his 
wife, “I wonder how many of the Augustinians of the olden time will ever come back.”169 
According to Ash, the war was over, but other battles that had not been resolved 
during the war entered a new phase. Though the major question of Union authority had 
been answered by military conquest, three factors remained that would plague 
Reconstruction: politics, race, and class. With Lee surrendered and the future unclear, 
military control remained over St. Augustine, with civil government shut down and 
martial law in place until 1868 when the local court system resumed. White southerners 
employed numerous methods to fight African American freedom and equality when 
deprived of civil government, while some U.S. Army officers used military occupation 
policy to try to promote some sort of equality between the races. Q. A. Gillmore began 
issuing orders in the Department of the South that would regulate race relations in 
occupied southern towns. On April 30, 1865 Gillmore’s order decreed, “Negroes are at 
all times, whether a truce exists or not, and at all places, whether within or beyond the 
lines, to be treated like white men, subject to such special instructions touching their 
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169 Andrew Anderson to Clarissa Anderson, April 16, 1865, Anderson Papers, MC 10, Box 2, Folder 55, 
SAHS, quoted in Graham, The Awakening of St. Augustine, 131. 
 86 
education, support, and colonization as have been given by the War Department to Brevet 
Major-General Saxton.”170  
Union officials were not always consistent in their destruction of racial controls 
and were at times sympathetic to the lamentations of southern whites in regards to the 
freedoms of African Americans. Southerners were not powerless either, as shown by the 
petition to Ulysses S. Grant to keep an all-white occupation force in the town.171 For 
instance, the collector of customs in St. Augustine, Thomas G. Foster, and sixty-nine 
other individuals petitioned Ulysses S. Grant against the removal of the Seventh U.S. 
Infantry for two African American regiments stating that, “negroes will be negroes” and 
would retard northern tourists, increase crime, and attract more African Americans to 
migrate to St Augustine, whose inhabitants were mostly women and children.172 African 
American troops never did take up permanent occupation in St. Augustine though they 
did they guard refugees from St. Augustine during one of the expulsions of 1863. 
Ash also briefly discusses the observations of visitors and returning people who 
described the scenes of destruction across the occupied South. John Francis Tenney, who 
visited Florida prior to the Civil War, returned to the state in 1865 and bought a piece of 
land in Northeast Florida. Tenney made several trips to St. Augustine and Jacksonville on 
business after purchasing a home and acres of land in Orange Mills. Tenney described St. 
Johns County and the countryside around St. Augustine as desolate, “the principal 
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sufferers were the cattle owners, whose stock was gathered up and transported north for 
the use of the Union troops.”173 Tenney further states that St. Augustine “retained its old 
time appearance and methods of living and doing,” signaling that despite the 
demographic shifts, the imposition of military rule, and the alteration of race relations, St. 
Augustine remained remarkably similar from when Tenney last visited in 1861. The fact 
that much of its old architecture survived the war is evidence that unlike other garrisoned 
towns, St. Augustine did not witness the type of vandalism and destruction to the degree 
that plagued towns like Jacksonville, which had several square blocks burned during the 
war. This makes St. Augustine unique in its ability to avoid large wholesale destruction 
of entire city blocks.174  
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CONCLUSION 
According to Stephen V. Ash, the damage incurred by the war and military 
occupation left scars on the towns and landscape of the occupied South. Ash states that 
communities were completely changed by the war from the physical damage and 
depopulation, as well as the destruction of slavery. Like much of the occupied South, St. 
Augustine was changed by the Civil War. Some of these changes were positive; slavery 
was removed from the Ancient City, fortifications surrounded the city, new piers were 
built, businesses reopened, and trade and tourism resumed. The city’s old architecture 
remained intact; making St. Augustine unique in its avoidance of large scale physical 
damage to the city’s buildings that were hallmarks of other garrisoned towns like 
Jacksonville. Lastly, the presence of Union soldiers in the town up to 1868 may have 
even led to the Ancient City avoiding the racial violence of the Ku Klux Klan that 
appeared elsewhere in Florida after the Civil War.175 
Other changes were less positive. Though gardens were blooming in St. 
Augustine and the architecture was intact, the many trees in town had been chopped 
down, caused by the army’s voracious need for fuel and entrenchments. Orange trees 
were picked clean by Union soldiers and hungry civilians. Roads in town were in poor 
condition and filled with trash as no maintenance was done in nearly five years. Furniture 
in homes had been stolen or hacked up for fuel or out of petty vandalism. Houses that had 
once belonged to white southerners now were in the possession of northern emigrants, 
Unionists, and prominent businessmen who had bought them at the Tax Commission 
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auctions. Finally, forty-eight percent of the town’s original inhabitants had left or were 
expelled, leaving the city eerily empty. 
 Confederate soldiers, Unionists, and other refugees slowly returned, but what 
happened to many of these refugees still remains a mystery for historians. Some refugees 
travelled to the interior of Florida, as was the case of Frances Kirby Smith who settled in 
Madison during the war. Many of St. Augustine’s displaced population settled in Middle 
Florida. Families such as the Putnams, Gibbs, and Smiths lived in Quincy and Madison, 
while a small “St. Augustine colony” headed by Dr. P. M. Myers established itself in 
Monticello. Other refugees travelled far and wide; Gumersindo Antonio Pacetti, one-time 
mayor of St. Augustine, resided in Cuba after the war, even holding a dinner in honor of 
Confederate General and former Vice President John C. Breckinridge in June 1865. With 
the war over, many Confederates fearing retribution after Lincoln’s assassination went 
into exile in Cuba.176 
The destruction in no-man’s-land surpassed that of the garrisoned city. Trees had 
been chopped down around town for fuel and to clear fields for effective fire to defend 
St. Augustine. Houses outside of town had been torn down or vandalized by Union 
soldiers in reprisals to guerrilla activity. Lumber yards, salt works, and other business 
interests were burned and confiscated by both Union and Confederate forces. Horses and 
beef herds had been either slaughtered or confiscated, leaving the countryside 
depopulated of livestock. The railroad to Ticoi which had been started near St. Augustine 
before the war was torn up. The boats along the St. Johns River that U.S. and 
Confederates forces destroyed to prevent the crossing of people and information from one 
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side to the other now stifled the resumption of trade between the coast and Florida’s 
interior. Lastly, the population in no-man’s-land suffered due to persecutions of 
Unionists, Confederate sympathizers expelled by Union soldiers, while slaves and 
disaffected southerners were removed by Confederates to Florida’s interior. By 1865, all 
of these actions left the countryside deserted. 
For those St. Augustinians who remained or returned to the Ancient City after the 
war, many wondered if their confiscated property would be returned or if compensation 
would be delivered. Union forces, enabled by the confiscation acts, requisitioned property 
and materials that could aid in the Union war effort from suspected Confederates 
sympathizers. However, no historian has ever been able to quantify how many St. Johns 
and St. Augustine civilians were Unionists who had their property confiscated. The 
Southern Claims Commission, a Congressional body designed to reimburse Unionist 
southerners who had their property requisitioned, recorded sixteen individuals from St. 
Johns County who were part of the claims process. The records indicate that out of the 
sixteen claims, only four were paid out, and the amounts paid were less than the 
requested amount. Given that well over ten percent of the population of St. Augustine 
took the oath of allegiance, it is logical to assume that the payouts by the claims 
commission never compensated the majority of southerners who had their possessions 
confiscated.177 
The three overarching factors of Ash’s occupation model, conciliation’s 
abandonment due to southern resistance, the zones of occupation, and changes to the 
southern community can be successfully applied to St. Augustine’s Civil War experience. 
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The first chapter set up the discussion of these overarching factors in keeping with Ash’s 
model by highlighting the lead up to war, the fear of invasion, the evacuations of 
Confederates, and the condition of the town upon initial Union occupation. In the 
antebellum period, southerners in St. Augustine had brought the question of secession to 
the forefront of public debate. Prior to secession, men organized themselves into units for 
home defense, while women did everything in their power to support them. Once 
secession was adopted, these men and women carried their state out of the Union, 
tightened slave controls, increased patrols, confiscated U.S. government arms and 
property, and nervously watched the coastline for any sign of Union gunboats’ approach. 
Once U.S. forces landed, southerners braced for the very worst, finding instead bold 
proclamations of friendship from conciliatory Union officers. These southerners, rather 
than openly resist at first, watched and waited as U.S. soldiers first took control of these 
towns.  
The second chapter discussed the three overarching factors of Ash’s model in the 
early occupation period, March 1862 to January 1863. The first factor was resistance to 
Union occupation and the eventual abandonment of the Union’s conciliatory approach. In 
St. Augustine, like much of the occupied South, Union troops found that southerners 
would not greet them as liberators, but as invaders. Women were openly defiant and 
privations began multiplying for soldiers and civilians alike. Violent resistance began to 
rear its ugly head in the form of Confederate irregulars who persecuted Unionists, caught 
escaped slaves, and attacked U.S. pickets and patrols. Frustrated by southerners, vengeful 
for the deaths of friends at the hands of partisans, U.S. forces abandoned conciliation 
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slowly, engaged in reprisals, and started the process that led to expulsions of hundreds of 
southern civilians. 
 The next factor applied to the early occupation period in the second chapter was 
the creation of three unique zones of occupation due to the resistance of southerners. 
These zones Ash labeled as: garrisoned towns that experienced direct Union presence, 
no-man’s-land that surrounded these garrisoned towns and were frequented by Union 
soldiers, and the Confederate frontier that was subjected to rare Union raids. These zones 
of occupation were successfully applied to St. Augustine; the Ancient City was a typical 
garrisoned town, surrounded by a no-man’s-land that stretched from the east bank of the 
St. Johns River all the way to New Smyrna, with a Confederate frontier extending from 
the west bank of the river. Union forces from St. Augustine and Confederates from the 
frontier raided and skirmished with each other in this no-man’s-land. The Confederate 
frontier experienced rare raids at the hands of Union troops who used Florida’s unique 
topography to ship troops up and down the St. Johns River. 
 The last factor that was applied to the early occupation of St. Augustine was 
changes to the community. Southern communities, according to Ash, were substantially 
changed by military occupation. The resistance from southern civilians caused Union 
soldiers to burn down homes in no-man’s-land that were frequented by guerrillas, destroy 
boats to prevent trade and mobility, impose harsher penalties on disloyal persons, 
beginning a process that eventually led to forced expulsion. The damage to no-man’s-
land, the depopulation it and St. Augustine suffered, and the economic stagnation all 
confirms Ash’s generalizations about changes made to southern communities during the 
early occupation period and are applicable to St. Augustine, Florida. 
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These three factors, conciliation abandoned, zones of occupation, and changes to 
the community all continued into the late occupation period. As 1863 dawned, U.S. 
troops abandoned conciliation wholesale as expulsions of southern civilians increased, 
with hundreds of women and children placed on transports and shipped out of St. 
Augustine. Guerrilla warfare in no-man’s-land became problematic, with dozens of 
Union soldiers being captured and killed, while Unionists were still persecuted and in 
many instances killed. All of these events and factors taken together inevitably led to 
significant changes in the southern community. These changes to southern communities 
are best exemplified in the forty-eight percent drop in original inhabitants of St. 
Augustine. 
Though Ash’s model is applicable to St. Augustine, it is by no means perfect. 
There are several facets of Ash’s argument that are more complex than he depicts and 
other aspects of the occupied South which he glosses over. Ash presents several 
arguments pertaining to the rural community and the accepted social order of planters, 
plain folk, and slaves that existed prior to the war. However, works by other historians 
have illustrated that such uniformity never existed in the South. Edward E. Baptist is one 
such historian who challenges the depiction of a uniform “Old South,” and illustrates that 
the expansion of slavery, class conflict, and the nature of the frontier created differences 
in the Old Southwest as it was gradually settled.178  
Ash’s model also predates Mark Grimsley’s work on Union war policy toward 
southern civilians and Ash’s description of the changes to Union war aims fails to capture 
the nuance and complexity of this change. Ash also fails to treat African American 
slaves, freedmen, and soldiers in his work, focusing instead on white southerners 
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attempts to curb black freedom. Ash’s focus reflects the division between wartime 
occupation, Reconstruction, and African American studies in Civil War historiography in 
the 1990s.  
With the war over, the reader is confronted with one last drawback of this study, 
because Ash ends his analysis at the end of the Civil War, and does not take the conflicts 
that he delineates during the war into the Reconstruction period. The efforts of white 
southerners to curb black freedom, which he briefly covers in his work, are not extended 
to the end of the war. This is a lost opportunity to explore the new conflicts and methods 
that white southerners employed to fight against orders of racial equality, exemplified by 
the order of General Gillmore. One is left wondering if the changes incurred during the 
war lasted throughout Reconstruction and if the destruction of slavery led to any 
temporary or sustained changes in race relations. Furthermore, Union troops and African 
Americans appear as passive players by the end of the war. Union troops appear to 
casually back away from the South despite a few pronouncements about social equality. 
African Americans are portrayed as passive victims awaiting the resurgent wrath of 
southern whites during Reconstruction. Both generalizations do little to clarify the 
experiences of these groups at the end of the Civil War.179 
With the evolution of new military history into the twenty-first century, historians 
like Judkin Browning have attempted to bridge this gap with comprehensive studies of 
Union soldiers, African Americans, and white southerners in the occupied South. This 
thesis serves as a stepping-stone for future studies of St. Augustine during the Civil War. 
With Ash’s model successfully applied to the Ancient City, a following study applying 
Browning’s conclusions to St. Augustine and St. Johns County is required to test his 
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assertions and to replicate his scope that bridges the divisions that existed in military 
occupation historiography. With that accomplished, a book length study that incorporates 
both approaches should be attempted for St. Augustine, St. Johns County, and all of 
Northeast Florida. 
As the sources indicate, Stephen V. Ash’s assertions about the changing of Union 
war aims due to southern resistance, the zones of occupation, and the changes in the 
southern community ring true for St. Augustine. Prior to the war, like most southerners, 
St. Augustinians feared that in the coming war, Union barbarism would unleash a torrent 
of destruction, rape, pillage, and suffering that would touch every corner of the South. 
This fear led most St. Augustinians and southerners to flee or grudgingly accept U.S. rule 
in the hopes of preventing the destruction of their town. Once it became clear to St. 
Augustinians that Union policy intended to be conciliatory, resistance began to blossom 
in the forms of non-violent insults and social snubs from citizens to outright violence 
from Confederate raiders, partisans, and guerrillas. This resistance over time induced the 
Union to adjust their war aims, adopting hard war policies that evicted St. Augustinians 
from their homes, confiscated their property, and changed the accepted racial and social 
mores, which had operated for decades. All of these circumstances combined to change 
the white southern community. This resulted in a forty-eight percent drop of original 
inhabitants, leaving empty homes, destitute families, broken kinship ties, and new 
problems of race relations. 
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The Union occupation of St. Augustine lasted from March 1862 to 1868. In the 
course of that time, eight regiments served in the city. A table of the progression of Union 
occupation will highlight the high turnover rate in the Department of the South. It was not 
at all uncommon for companies from different regiments to occupy St. Augustine at the 
same time, moving in and out of the town based on the military expeditions being 
launched in the Department of the South, like the attempts to take Charleston in 1863 or 
the Olustee campaign in 1864. Furthermore, requests for troops from other commanders 
in different military departments could draw away troops, like during General Ulysses S. 
Grant’s Virginia campaign in 1864. The following table simplifies the issue of multiple 
companies in St. Augustine by listing the regiment in command of the post. This topic of 
troop rotation and the effect on the occupied South is not covered in Stephen V. Ash’s 
work and illustrates one of St. Augustine’s unique occupation factors.180 
Fourth New Hampshire March 1862 to September 1862 
Seventh New Hampshire September 1862 to June 1863 
Seventh Connecticut June 1863 to August 1863 
Forty-Eighth New York August 1863 to September 1863 
Twenty-Fourth Massachusetts September 1863 to February 1864 
Tenth Connecticut September 1863 to February 1864 
Seventeenth Connecticut February 1864 to July 1865 
Seventh Regular U.S. Infantry July 1865 to 1868 
 
  
                                                 
180 Frank J. Welcher, The Union Army 1861-1865, Organization and Operations Volume I: The Eastern 
Theater. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989): 96-99, 101, 103, 105-106,110, 113; General Order 
No. 47 Q. A. Gillmore, June 12, 1863, War of the Rebellion, Series 1, Vol. 28, Part 2, 3; W. L. M. Burger 
to Brigadier General John P. Hatch, August 15, 1864 War of the Rebellion, Series I, Volume 35, Pt. 2, 239-
240. 
 100 




The order of the commanders of the Department of the South, like the regiments 
who served in St. Augustine, is convoluted. As illustrated, the commanders of the 
Department of the South changed often. This high rate of turn of among commanders 
affected the occupation of the town, as soldiers and civilians were forced to readjust to 
commander’s leadership style. This high turnover rate no doubt created an air of 
uncertainty about the fate of the town and how policy would be implemented. Though 
Stephen V. Ash does discuss the wide latitude that commanders were granted without 
clear orders from the Lincoln administration, he does not analyze how the quick turnover 
of commanders could affect the implementation of occupation policy.181 
Thomas W. Sherman June 1861 to March 1862 
David Hunter March 1862 to September 1862 
John M. Brannan September 1862  
Ormsby M. Mitchell September 1862 to October 1862 
John M. Brannan October 1862 to January 1863 
David Hunter January 1863 to June 1863 
Quincy A. Gillmore June 1863 to May 1864 
John P. Hatch May 1864 
John G. Foster May 1864 to February 1865 
Quincy A. Gillmore February 1865 to June 1865 
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